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The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v.
Caballes: How to Make the World Safe for
Binary Searches
Ric Simmons

Abstract

This Article discusses the recent Supreme Court decision Illinois v. Caballes,
which held that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the use of drug-detection
dogs, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. It argues that the Caballes case
paves the way for widespread and indiscriminant use of a new type of surveillance known as a binary search. A binary search is defined as a search which
provides the law enforcement official with no information about the subject other
than whether or not illegal activity is present. Drug-detection dogs are one example of a binary search, but there are many others which are being developed,
such as portable gun detectors or software protocols that sift through all e-mails
passing through an internet service provider looking for child pornography.
Since the Caballes case did very little in the way of defining binary searches and
discussing the appropriate limitations (if any) on their use, the Article seeks provide some guidance to courts in evaluating the constitutionality of binary searches
in the future. The Article begins by discussing the history of the binary search doctrine, focusing on its application to drug-detection dogs, which up until now have
been the most common form of binary search in use. The Article then analyzes
the Caballes decision itself, examining what it does and does not resolve about
the constitutionality of binary searches. Finally, the Article attempt to resolve the
important unanswered questions in Caballes: first, how accurate does a surveillance technique have to be in order to be considered a binary search, and second,
how does the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures limit
or prevent the widespread use of binary searches?
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In The Adventure of the Blue Carbuncle, Sherlock Holmes is presented with a
worn, hard-felt hat that had been found in the street by a friend.1 Using nothing but a
magnifying glass and a set of forceps, the world’s greatest forensic detective examines
the hat and determines the following about its owner: he was highly intellectual; he had
been well-off in the past but had now fallen on hard times due to an increasingly serious
Assistant Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University. I would like to thank
Angela Lloyd, Alexis Andrews, and Robert Ruhlin for their helpful feedback and comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
1
See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 149 (1993).
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drinking habit; his wife no longer loved him; he was physically out of shape; and he did
not possess gas heat in his house.2 However, for all his deductive abilities, Holmes
confessed he was unable to determine whether the owner of the hat had been involved in
criminal activity.3
Detective Holmes serves as a useful symbol for modern law enforcement agents,
who, lacking his superhuman powers of observation and deduction, rely instead upon
modern technologies and vast computer databases to conduct surveillance and analyze
data. Using these new advances, today’s law enforcement officials can deduce the most
intimate details of our lives—from the contents of our private phone conversations4 to the
files we store on our computers5—and like Holmes, these agents must then sift through
these details to try and surmise whether criminal activity is afoot. This process—the
need to investigate potential criminal conduct through the distasteful but unavoidable
invasion of individual privacy—creates the constant tension that underpins most of our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.6
But the past few decades have seen the rise of a new category of surveillance, one
which will conceivably allow law enforcement agents to bypass the unpalatable prying
into individuals’ private lives and instead provide a direct answer to the only question the
agent truly cares about: whether or not the individual under surveillance is currently

2

Id. at 152.
Id. at 149-50. Of course, eventually Holmes was able to determine that although the owner of the hat was
innocent, he did in fact play an unwitting role in the theft and subsequent hiding of a very valuable gem. Id
at 158-69. But this was only after a further investigation which revealed additional confidential facts, both
personal and commercial, regarding the potential suspects. Id.
4
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d. 339, 340-41. (2003).
6
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (the “reasonableness” of a search under the Fourth
Amendment depends on balancing “the need to search” against “the invasion which the search…entails”).
3
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committing a crime. This type of surveillance is known as a “binary search,”7 since it
provides the law enforcement agent with only a positive or a negative response as to the
existence of illegal activity, and reveals nothing else about the individual under
surveillance. The most widespread example of a binary search today is the use of drug
detection dogs that alert only if they smell illegal substances. However, many other types
of binary searches are just on the horizon, such as hand-held gun detectors, software
protocols that sift through e-mails searching for illegal material, or facial recognition
technology.8 These emerging technologies are poised to revolutionize the way law
enforcement agents investigate crime—and this revolution has just gotten a significant
boost from the recent Supreme Court decision Illinois v. Caballes,9 which held that the
use of a drug detection dog during a legitimate traffic stop did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment.10
But although Caballes provided a solid and unambiguous doctrinal justification
for the indiscriminant use of drug detection dogs—and by extension, other forms of
binary searches—it failed to answer two critical questions about such searches: first, what
types of surveillance should qualify as a binary search; and second, what limits (if any)
should be placed on their use?
This Article will propose answers to both of these questions, with the intention of
providing guidance to future courts as they analyze and rule upon binary search
questions. But first, it is important to understand how binary searches generally fit into
the context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II of the Article will provide an

7

See United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See infra notes 80–91and accompanying text.
9
543 U.S. ____; 2005 LEXIS 769 (2005).
10
Id. at ___, *7–*8.
8
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overview of the binary search doctrine and describe the state of the law at the time the
Supreme Court heard the Caballes case.11 Part III will review how the courts have
applied the binary search doctrine, focusing on drug detection dogs, since they represent
the first working example of a binary search in widespread use.12 Part IV will analyze
the Caballes decision itself, and clarify what it did and did not make plain about the use
of drug detection dogs and binary searches more generally.13 Finally, Part V will propose
answers to the two questions that Caballes did not address: first, how accurate does a
surveillance technique have to be before it can be considered a binary search; and second,
what amount of delay and/or intrusion is permissible before a binary search implicates
the Fourth Amendment—not as a search, but rather as an unconstitutional seizure?14

II.

Legal Background of the Binary Search Doctrine
A.

The birth of the doctrine and the subsequent controversy

Twenty-two years ago in United States v. Place,15 the Supreme Court held that a
canine sniff of a suitcase by a trained narcotics dog did not constitute a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment.16 The Court offered two rationales for this conclusion: first, a
canine sniff is “non-intrusive” (at least when compared to an officer “rummaging through
the contents of the luggage”); and second, the sniff could only detect evidence of a

11

See infra notes 15–76and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77–161 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 162–198 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 199–245 and accompanying text.
15
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
16
Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Arguably, this conclusion was merely dicta, since the Supreme Court found the
government action unconstitutional on other grounds, namely that the length of the seizure was out of
proportion to the facts supporting reasonable suspicion. Id. at 709–10. See, e.g., David A. Harris,
Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMPLE L.
REV 1, 33 (1996).
12
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contraband item, leaving any private non-contraband items hidden from public view.17
The Court rather myopically termed the canine sniff sui generis, since it was “aware of
no other investigative procedure that is so limited in both the manner in which the
information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure.”18
The Court was made aware of another such procedure less than six months later,
when it was presented with the use of a chemical test to determine the presence of
narcotics in the case of United States v. Jacobsen.19 Fortunately, Jacobsen gave the
Court an opportunity to refine its Place analysis somewhat and focus only on the content
of information revealed by the procedure, ignoring the “non-intrusive” language in
Place.20 The Jacobsen Court further refined the concept of a “binary” search21—a search
which can only reveal evidence of illegal activity and no other fact—and declared that
such a search does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.22
In developing the binary search doctrine, the Court in Place and Jacobsen was not
breaking new ground; rather, it was arriving at the logical destination of a journey which
began with the seminal case of Katz v. United States.23 Katz held that government
surveillance implicates the Fourth Amendment if and only if it infringes on an
17

Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
Id.
19
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
20
Id. at 122–24. In determining whether the chemical test was a “search,” the Court merely asked whether
the government activity “infringe[d] an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable.” Id. at 122. Later, in summarizing Place, the Court likewise ignored the “limited matter”
aspect of the Place analysis, saying that the reason the canine sniff in Place was not a search was because
“the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about non-contraband items.” Id. at 124 n.24.
21
Although Place and Jacobsen created and refined the concept of a binary search, the Court did not use the
term in either case. The term was first coined by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469,
474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“As in Place, the driving force behind Jacobsen was the recognition that because of
the binary nature of the information disclosed by the sniff, no legitimately private information is
revealed….”)
22
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122.
23
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18
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individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”24 Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence
further defined a “reasonable” expectation as one which the law recognizes as
legitimate—not merely a subjective expectation of not being discovered.25 An individual
has no legitimate privacy interest in purely illegal activity;26 thus, if a given type of
investigation (such as a chemical drug test or a canine sniff) can only reveal evidence of
illegitimate activity, it cannot by definition be a search.
But this destination did not please everyone on the Court. Disssenting in
Jacobsen, Justice Brennan wrote that the binary search doctrine would allow police to
release trained narcotics dogs into public areas “to roam the streets at random, alerting
the officers to people carrying cocaine.”27 More ominous (at least to Justice Brennan),
was the idea that someday law enforcement would develop a device that could
instantaneously detect whether someone was carrying cocaine and then “set[] up such a
device on a street corner and scan[] all passersby” or “cruis[e] through a residential
neighborhood and us[e] the device to identify all homes in which the drug cocaine is
present.”28
These concerns resonated with at least two of the Justices hearing the Caballes
case. Caballes once again presented the Court with the issue of whether the Fourth
Amendment required any showing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify
the use of a drug detection dog. The Illinois Attorney General began her oral argument in
Caballes by citing Place for the proposition that a sniff by a drug-detection dog was not a

24

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
26
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
27
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Many commentators have rejected the binary search
doctrine at least in part because of these concerns. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 37–45.
28
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25
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search and therefore did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.29 Within the first two
minutes, Justices Souter and Ginsburg immediately picked up where Justice Brennan had
left off in his Jacobsen dissent and presented her with the logical (if extreme) conclusion
of her argument:
Justice Souter: …I assume nothing prevents the police from taking the
dogs through every municipal garage in the United States and I suppose there’s
nothing that prevents the police from taking dogs to every homeowner’s door,
ringing the bell, and seeing if the dog gets a sniff of something when the door is
opened.30
…
Justice Ginsburg: If we say, as you urge, a dog sniff is not a search, then
the police are free to parade up and down every street in the country with dogs
sniffing car trunks.31
To nobody’s surprise, the Caballes majority affirmed Place and Jacobsen and
confirmed that a sniff by a trained drug detection dog is not a search.32 The decision is
significant primarily because of the rationale the Court used to uphold these searches: by
confirming the validity of the binary search doctrine,33 the decision is certain to
encourage law enforcement to make even broader use of drug detection dogs specifically
and binary searches more generally. But the majority opinion failed to address the
concerns articulated first by Justice Brennan in Jacobsen and echoed by Justices Souter

29

Illinois v. Caballes, No. 03-923, Oral Argument Transcript at 4.
Id.
31
Id. at 5.
32
Caballes, 543 U.S. ____, ____; 2005 LEXIS 769, *7–*8 (2005).
33
The Court had at least three different rationales it could have used to approve of the canine sniffs: first,
the “plain smell” doctrine—that is, that the canine sniff is merely a more efficient tool for detecting
something (in this case, a scent), that the officer already had a constitutional right to detect on his or her
own (much like a flashlight assists an officer in seeing things in plain view that he or she already has a
right to see); second, the limited intrusiveness/limited in scope argument—that is, that the method being
used by the law enforcement agent is “non-intrusive” (because the dog does not enter the car or otherwise
infringe on a protected place) and therefore does not constitute a search; and third, the binary search
doctrine. Of these three, the Court chose the latter. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at ___, 2005 LEXIS at *6 (“We
have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate, and thus, governmental
conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest. (citing
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123)). See also, infra notes 115–161 and accompanying text.
30
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and Ginsburg in their questions and ultimately in their dissenting opinions in Caballes:34
if there are no Fourth Amendment restrictions on canine sniffs (or other binary searches),
what is to prevent their widespread and indiscriminate use? But this question assumes
too much; the real question is: if canine sniffs (and other binary searches) only reveal
evidence of illegitimate activity, would we want to prevent their indiscriminate and
widespread use? To refine the question still further, we should ask: what characteristics
does a surveillance procedure need to have before it can be considered a “binary search”
and therefore fall outside the restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment? This
question remains unanswered by Caballes; indeed, it was not even asked by the Caballes
Court.35
B.

The tension between Terry and Place/Jacobsen

The use of drug detection dogs, such as the one in Caballes, represents a potential
conflict between two lines of case law. The first arose from the seminal case of Terry v.
Ohio,36 which allowed for a brief search and seizure by law enforcement even without
probable cause as long as the intrusion onto the Fourth Amendment rights was
reasonable; i.e., properly limited and justified by specific and articulable facts.37 The
second, beginning with Place and continuing through Jacobsen and Indianapolis v.

34

The Caballes decision was 6-2; Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision. Justices
Souter and Ginsburg each wrote a dissenting opinion, and Justice Souter joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at ___, 2005 LEXIS at *10 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A]n uncritical adherence to
Place would render the Fourth Amendment indifferent to suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars
in parking garages and pedestrians on sidewalks….”); id. at *30–*31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Today’s
decision…clears the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks
and in parking lots…[n]or would motorists have constitutional grounds for complaint should police with
dogs, stationed at long traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to turn green.”)
35
The question certified by the Supreme Court in granting certiorari in Caballes was “Whether the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog during a
legitimate traffic stop.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at ___, 2005 LEXIS at *3–*4.
36
329 U.S. 1 (1968).
37
Id. at 20-22.
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Edmond,38 had stated quite clearly (though arguably in dicta) that a canine sniff was not a
search because it could only provide information about the existence of contraband and
thus could not infringe on a “reasonable [legitimate] expectation of privacy.”39 In its
simplest form, the Caballes case was about whether canine sniffs require some
intermediary level of justification akin to a Terry stop or do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment at all, as implied by the Place line of cases.40
1.

Terry’s restriction on seizures

Terry v. Ohio rejected the “all-or-nothing” approach to analyzing seizures,
holding that the Fourth Amendment regulates police conduct even if it falls short of a
“technical arrest.”41 In evaluating the propriety of a “stop and frisk” by a police officer,
the Court held that the police officer’s conduct must be “reasonable” in light of the
circumstances.42 This is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring a court to take into account the
“governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion” upon the defendant’s
rights, and requiring the law enforcement officer to show “specific and articulable
facts…which reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”43 Using this test, the Terry Court
concluded that the “severe, though brief” intrusion caused by a body frisk was justified
by the need to ensure the safety of an officer investigating possible criminal activity.44

38

531 U.S. 32 (2000).
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123-24. See also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Place, 462 U.S. at 706-7; Edmond,
531 U.S. at 40.
40
The Illinois Supreme Court had held that canine sniffs do implicate the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore applied Terry to determine whether the use of the drug-detection dog was “reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 508;
802 N.E.2d at 204.
41
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 21-22.
44
Id. at 24-27.
39
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Terry therefore provides law enforcement officers with the ability to conduct
some level of seizure even if they lack the probable cause to make a full-blown arrest, but
it also limits law enforcement actions by requiring some level of reasonable (and factspecific) suspicion before allowing even a low-level seizure. For example, if a law
enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is
about to commit a crime, Terry gives the officer the right to briefly detain the individual
and ask a limited number of questions to confirm or deny the officer’s suspicions.45
However, even an initially valid detention could become unreasonable if it exceeds its
initial justification in duration or severity.46
The Illinois Supreme Court had held that Terry was the controlling authority for
the use of drug-detection dogs, at least in the context of traffic stops.47 The key question
for the Illinois court was whether the police officer’s action in using the drug-detection
dog was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.”48 More broadly, any time a law enforcement officer seeks to detain or
otherwise physically interfere with an individual, the officer must ensure that the level of
interference does not rise above a de minimis level and therefore require at least a Terry
justification. This is true even if the surveillance that they are conducting itself needs no
justification. For example, police officers are allowed to observe individuals and vehicles
in public areas and watch for signs of illegal activity without any showing of suspicion at

45

See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
Id.
47
Caballes, 207 Ill.2d at 508; 802 N.E.2d at 203.
48
Id. at 508, 204. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20). However, the Illinois Supreme Court applied Terry
to the search question as opposed to the seizure question, an approach which the United States Supreme
Court did not support. Compare id. at 508–510 with Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *6-*9
(2005).
46
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all.49 However, they are not allowed to randomly order an individual to stop and stand
still for ninety seconds while the officer conducts a visual examination of the individual’s
clothing and mannerisms; likewise, they cannot pull over an automobile without
justification in order to closely examine its occupants, even if the occupants are in plain
view.50 Thus, if the use of the drug dog in Caballes was itself considered a “seizure,” or
if it impermissibly expanded the scope of a previously justified seizure, the surveillance
method would violate the Fourth Amendment even if the search itself were permissible.
2. Place and Jacobsen and the evolution of the binary search doctrine
In Place, law enforcement agents briefly detained the defendant as he was waiting
to board a plane from Miami to New York.51 The defendant consented to a search of his
luggage, but the law enforcement officers allowed him to board the plane without
conducting a search.52 Further investigation led the agents in Miami to contact the Drug
Enforcement Agency in New York, and these agents approached the defendant after he
claimed his bags at La Guardia.53 The agents in New York still lacked probable cause,
and the defendant (perhaps a bit wiser than he had been in Miami) denied their request to
49

See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1983) (“[A]n individual may not legitimately
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding
the home.” ) See also United States v. Martin, 509 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1975) (“We find nothing in the
Katz opinion indicating that if an officer had merely stood outside the booth and heard what Katz was
saying, Katz's rights would have been invaded. Eavesdropping from a place where the officer has a right to
be is a long-accepted technique of crime detection, not outlawed by the Fourth Amendment. If Katz had
talked loud enough to be overheard, his expectation of privacy would be gone. So here the activities in the
Martin house were conducted in such a manner as to be seen and smelled from the adjoining property.
Whatever expectation of privacy Martin and his cohorts had was defeated by their own activities.”)
(emphasis added).
50
To stop a person for investigatory purposes, a police officer must “have a reasonable suspicion supported
by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). These facts must provide some level of objective justification, not just a hunch. Id.
51
Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
52
Id.
53
Id. The defendant had told the Miami agents that he recognized they were police, which prompted even
more suspicion on their part. They then investigated the address tags on the checked luggage and found
they contained different street addresses. Upon further investigation, the agents learned that neither street
address actually existed; moreover, the phone number the defendant had given the airline belonged to a
third address. Id.
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search his luggage.54 The agents seized the luggage and took it to Kennedy airport,
where a trained narcotics dog sniffed the bags and alerted to one of them.55 A total of
ninety minutes had elapsed since the agents had seized the luggage from the defendant.56
After the intervening weekend, the agents used the canine sniff evidence to procure a
warrant from a magistrate,57 and upon opening the bag discovered over a kilogram of
cocaine.58
The Court reviewed both the seizure of the luggage and the “search” (or quasisearch) by the drug-detection dog. The seizure was analyzed under the test set out by
Terry: balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion.”59 The Court agreed with the government that the state had a
substantial interest in identifying individuals who traffic in illegal drugs, and implied that
the agents possessed specific and articulable facts to support their belief that the
defendant was such an individual.60 However, the Court held that the duration of the
seizure was unreasonable under the Terry rationale.61 The Court stopped short of setting

54

Id. at 698–99.
Id. at 699.
56
Id.
57
A positive reaction by a trained narcotics dog has universally been held to give police probable cause to
search the item in question. See, e.g. United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963, 966 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding
that a positive alert by a drug-detection dog provides probable cause; see also infra note 106–108 and
accompanying text.
58
Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
59
Id. at 703.
60
Id. at 703. Although the Court never stated directly that the agents had specific and articulable facts, they
based their decision on the duration of the seizure, implying that a shorter seizure would have been
permissible (id. at 709–10); thus, the Court implied that the agents did indeed have enough specific and
articulable facts to conduct a brief, limited Terry seizure.
61
Id. at 709–10. The Court acknowledged that seizures of property can vary in their degree of
intrusiveness, based on the duration of the seizure and the type of property being seized. Id. at 705–08.
55
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a time limit for Terry seizures, but noted that it had never approved of a 90-minute
seizure under the Terry doctrine.62
As far as the use of the drug detection dog, the court stated (in dicta)63 that the
canine sniff did not constitute a “search” and therefore did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment.64 The Court noted that the search in this case was both unobtrusive in its
method and limited in the information that it obtained.65 Unfortunately, the Court limited
its conclusion to the specific facts of the case, stating that “the particular course of
investigation that the agents intended to pursue here” was acceptable.66 Believing that
this type of investigation was sui generis,67 the Court apparently felt no need to provide
broader guidelines or standards which could assist future courts in analyzing such
investigative procedures.
Jacobsen gave the Court a chance to correct this omission. In Jacobsen, a
package being sent by Federal Express was accidentally damaged at the airport. The
Federal Express employees opened the package to determine its contents for insurance
purposes, and found tubes containing bags of white powder.68 The employees contacted
the Drug Enforcement Agency, and an agent arrived, cut open each of the four bags and
subjected the powder to a series of chemical tests to determine whether the powder was
cocaine.69
62

Id. at 709–10.
Since the decision on the seizure issue was sufficient to decide the case, there was no need to discuss the
issue of whether the use of the drug detection dog constituted a search. Indeed, the defendant did not
specifically contest the validity of the canine sniff in the trial court, and the issue was not briefed or argued
for the Supreme Court. Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring). .
64
Id. at 707.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111 (1984).
69
Id. at 111–12, 112 n.1. The powder was placed in three different test tubes, causing the substance in each
test tubes to change color if cocaine is present. As the Court pointed out, “Such a test discloses whether or
63
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The actions by the private parties clearly did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment,70 so the Court focused on the investigation of the DEA agent who arrived
after the package had been opened. The “seizure” which occurred when the DEA agent
exercised dominion and control over the package and re-opened it to visually examine its
contents was permissible because the package had already been examined by the Federal
Express employees who had a right to examine it; thus, the defendants’ “privacy interest
in the contents of the package had been largely compromised.”71

The chemical test,

however, went beyond what the private employees had done in the absence of state
action, and required an application of the Katz test: does a field test which can only
disclose the presence or absence of contraband violate an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider reasonable?72
The Court held that the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
by the test, since regardless of whether the test result was positive or negative, it would
reveal nothing to the government agent that violated a reasonable and legitimate
expectation of privacy. Quoting Katz, the Court noted that “a burglar plying his trade in
a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective
expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as “legitimate.”73

By

focusing on the legitimacy requirement of the Katz test, the Court concluded that a
chemical examination (and by extension, any other method of investigation) which can

not the substance is cocaine, but there is no evidence that [the test] would identify any other substances.”
Id. at 112 n.1.
70
Id. at 114–18.
71
Id. at 120–21.
72
Id. at 122.
73
Id. at 100 n.22 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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only reveal the presence or absence of illegitimate or illegal activity is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment.74
The Court went back to “clarify” its position from the Place case a year before.
Before Jacobsen, Place was a rather unhelpful precedent in the search context for three
reasons: first, the approval of the canine sniff was merely dicta; second, the Court
explicitly stated that the search aspect of its analysis was intended for that specific fact
pattern alone; and finally, the language used in approving the search had been somewhat
messy and unfocused, highlighting not only the binary nature of the search but also its
comparatively non-intrusive manner. The Jacobsen Court could not, of course, turn the
Place dicta into a binding holding for canine sniffs, but it took pains to revise the
meaning of the dicta to make it much more useful for future cases:
[Defendant’s] attempt to distinguish Place, arguing that it involved no
physical invasion of Place’s effects, unlike the [government] conduct at issue
here. However. . .the reason [the canine sniff in Place] did not intrude upon any
legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could reveal
nothing about noncontraband items.75
The Court thus transformed the fact-specific dicta from Place into a precursor to the
binary test of Jacobsen, a test that included a clear standard which was plainly intended
to apply to future cases.
The Court did not re-visit the binary search doctrine for twenty-one years, when it
granted certiorari in the Caballes case. Caballes was an opportunity for the Justices to
merge the seizure restrictions of Terry with the permissive binary search doctrine of
74

Id. at 100–01 (“Congress has decided…to treat the interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as
illegitimate; thus, governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other
arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.”)
The Jacobsen Court also briefly considered whether the government agents had conducted an
illegal “seizure” by destroying a small amount of the powder during the course of the chemical test. The
Court easily found that the loss of such a “trace amount” of material was more than justified by the
“substantial” law enforcement interest in conducting the test. Id. at 124n25.
75
Id. at 124 n.24 (emphasis in the original).
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Place and Jacobsen, thus providing lower courts—and police—a clear standard to follow
in evaluating (and designing) binary searches in the future. As we will see, the Court
effectively declined that opportunity, resoundingly affirming the binary search doctrine
of Place but leaving the question of possible limitations for another day.76 Before turning
to the decision itself, it will be useful to examine how the binary search doctrine has been
applied in the lower courts, using canine sniffs as a case study to illustrate the potential
promise and potential dangers of this type of investigation.

III.

Application of the Binary Search Doctrine
A.

Potential types of binary searches

As noted above,77 the term “binary search” was first used five years after
Jacobsen by the D.C. Circuit in a case involving the use of a drug detection dog on the
sleeper car of a train.78 Since then, other forms of binary searches have appeared, both in
academic scholarship and in the real world: “gun detectors” that will only alert if the
individual is carrying a firearm;79 handheld mechanical explosive detectors;80 software
that can monitor thousands of e-mails being sent over the internet and alert a human

76

See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; slip. op. at 4 (“In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the
exterior of respondent’s car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on
respondent’s privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable argument.”).
See also notes 175-188 and accompanying text.
77
See supra note 21.
78
United States v. Colyer, 879 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir 1989) (“As in Place, the driving force behind
Jacobsen was the recognition that because of the binary nature of the information disclosed by the sniff, no
legitimately private information is revealed: That is, ‘the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about
noncontraband items.’" (citation to Jacobsen omitted)).
79
Alyson R. Rosenberg, Comment: Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New Weapon In the Fight Against
Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation? 9A LB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 135, 138–40 (1998).
80
See http://www.usiegroup.com/r_productDetails.aspx?PID=249&PcatID=100 (company selling the “E
3500-Portable Advanced Explosives Detector”).
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agent only if illegal material (such as child pornography) is attached to the message;81
facial recognition devices that can scan an individual faces in a crowd and only alert if
the face matches that of a known fugitive.82
Although none of these technologies yet exist in a perfect binary form, many of
them are already being used by law enforcement. Gun detectors,83 heat detectors,84
mechanical narcotic detectors,85 and software that “sniffs” out e-mails passing through
the internet,86 are all examples of technologies currently in use by law enforcement that
could theoretically become binary searches if properly refined. For an investigative
technique to be considered a pure binary search, it must only give the user a positive or
negative response about whether the individual or item being investigated is committing a
81

See, e.g., Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 Hastings L.J. 1303, 1352 (2002). The federal government
currently uses an “internet-sniffing” protocol known as “DCS1000” (formerly known as “Carnivore”)
which can be attached to an internet service provider’s site and sift through incoming and outgoing e-mails,
looking for and then copying messages to or from the target individual. See Dan Eggen, 'Carnivore'
Glitches Blamed for FBI Woes; Problems With E-Mail Surveillance Program Led to Mishandling of al
Qaeda Probe in 2000, Memo Says, Washington Post, May 29, 2002 at A7. Obviously in its current form the
protocol is non-binary and requires not just a warrant but a Title III order before it can be used; but future
versions of the protocol could conceivably be designed to only detect illegal activity to simply alert law
enforcement as to the name of the individual sending the offending e-mail.
82
See Richard Winton, LAPD officers field-test a hand-held computer using facial recognition to identify
suspects. Critics raise issues of privacy and reliability, L.A. TIMES, December 25, 2004 at B1 (describing a
hand-held computer in use by the Los Angeles police which compares the suspects’ face to a database of
known fugitives or gang members). In an interaction described in the article, the device claimed 94%
accuracy in identifying a certain individual as a known gang member. Id. When used on individuals in
public places, such a device does not require probable cause, since individuals in public have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their facial appearance in public. However, if the device were converted to give
only a binary output – a signal sent to law enforcement if it found a match with a known fugitive, for
example—it could conceivably be used in private areas without violating the Fourth Amendment. For a
discussion on the constitutionality of such searches, see John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious
Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Technology, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65 (2002).
83
See Rosenberg, Comment, supra note 79 at 138–40.
84
See United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001).
85
See Richard S. Julie, High Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth Amendment: Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 137–39 (2000) (describing
the “Sentor,” which relies on principles of gas chromatography and mass spectrometry to analyze air which
is sucked in from near a person’s body. As of now the Sentor is decidedly non-binary; it can inform law
enforcement, for example, whether the subject of the search is taking prescription drugs for treating HIV.
Id. at 138. The device also has accuracy concerns, since it might result in a false positive for an individual
who was near illegal drugs in the past (or with someone who had a large amount of drugs) but who at the
moment was not carrying any illegal drugs. Id. at 138–39.
86
See Eggen, supra note 81, at A7.
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crime. As of now, all of these devices return too much information to the law
enforcement user to be termed binary searches. For example, hand-held gun detectors
exist that use passive millimeter wave imagery to display an outline of metal objects
carried by an individual.87 In such a format, use of the gun detector is plainly a “search;”
even though it does not physically interfere with the individual under surveillance, it
provides the law enforcement officer with information about the individual that is
covered by a reasonable expectation of privacy: to wit, an outline of all of the metal
objects carried in their clothing. However, in order to turn this tool into a binary search
device, the manufacturer could simply remove the graphic display from the device and
instead install software that could “read” the image seen by the device and alert the user
if and only if the object being detected were determined to be a firearm. Only in that
form would the device pass the binary search test, since it would only tell the law
enforcement officer one thing about the individual under surveillance: whether that
person was carrying a concealed firearm.88
Likewise, heat detectors and software that scans e-mails are currently unable to
distinguish between innocent heat emissions and electronic transmissions and those that
definitively show that the defendant is committing a crime; instead, they pass along their
output (which includes information about legitimate, protected activities) to their human
operators.89 It is then up to the human operators of these devices to study the heat

87

See Rosenberg, Comment, supra note 79 at 138–40.
Even this would not constitute a binary search unless the device were being used in a jurisdiction (or
under specific circumstances) in which it was illegal to carry a concealed firearm.
89
In Kyllo, the Court famously noted that the thermal imager in question could inform law enforcement of
“the hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
88
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patterns or e-mails and determine whether a crime is being committed—and in the act of
studying these images or transmissions, the human operator is conducting a search.90
Thus, although the binary search doctrine has the potential to become extremely
important in decades to come, most of the binary searches that could someday be used by
law enforcement are not yet a reality—at least not in a pure binary form. Almost all of
these devices require a level of technology that remains just over the horizon in order to
be converted into binary searches. Essentially, of all the binary searches mentioned in
law review articles and court cases, only two are currently in use by law enforcement:
canine sniffs and chemical field tests (like the one used in Jacobsen).91
While chemical field tests are certainly binary searches, the doctrine has little
practical application in their context. In almost every case in which a chemical field test
is used, the law enforcement officer has already demonstrated probable cause in order to
justify the seizure of the substance being tested. Thus, almost by definition, law
enforcement officers need not rely on the binary search doctrine to justify chemical field
tests, because they were already required to show probable cause in order to get the

90

See, e.g., id. at 40-41.
There is a third category of binary searches that have been considered (infrequently) by courts: the use
of merchandise tags by private stores which are programmed to set off an alarm if an individual leaves the
store without paying for the merchandise. Like canine sniffs and chemical field tests, an alert from such a
device tells law enforcement only one thing: that the defendant is involved in illegal activity; and, also like
canine sniffs and chemical field tests, such an alert will constitute probable cause and lead to a full-scale
search of the individual’s bag. Such devices are predominantly used by private companies, which are not
covered by the Fourth Amendment—but in rare cases in which courts have found the private security
guards to be “state actors,” they have applied the binary search doctrine to approve the use of such devices.
See Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360, 364 (D.C. 1980) (implying in dicta that the use of the
merchandise tags would be constitutional even without reasonable suspicion, because “[i]t reveals nothing
about the subject or his belongings other than whether he is carrying store merchandise with live tags
beyond the point where he should have paid for the merchandise and had the tags removed.”)
Although the private aspect of the use of merchandise tags generally puts them beyond the scope
of the Fourth Amendment, the broad extent of their use demonstrates the potential efficiency of binary
searches, while their relative non-intrusiveness demonstrates the potential promise of binary searches as an
extremely effective but narrowly-tailored surveillance tool which would not violate an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
91

19
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

substance in the first place.92 Canine sniffs, on the other hand, can be effectively used to
detect narcotics or other contraband at a distance, thus providing law enforcement with a
powerful tool to search for illegal activity without probable cause or even reasonable
suspicion. Given these factors, it is no surprise that canine sniffs have become widely
used by law enforcement.93
Therefore, canine sniffs are unique: they belong to a category of searches that
could conceivably revolutionize the way law enforcement agents conduct surveillance in
the near future, but (because they do not rely upon a new and emerging technology) they
themselves have been around for over thirty-five years.94 Literally hundreds of federal
cases have assessed the propriety of canine sniffs under different circumstances, and the
Supreme Court has now visited the issue twice (though neither visit was particularly
enlightening for the law enforcement agents and courts that utilize and evaluate these
searches on a regular basis).95 By accident of history, canine sniffs have become the test
case for the impending flood of binary search techniques to come.
B.

Canine sniffs – the first practical, widespread use of binary searches

The first known use of detection dogs in this country was in World War II, when
the United States Army trained approximately 140 dogs to detect trip wires and nonmetallic landmines.96 By the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, as drug use became more
92

The Jacobsen case was a rare exception to this rule, since it involved suspected contraband which was
legitimately in the hands of a private third party (a shipping company), who then called in the law
enforcement officers to test the substance which they had inadvertently spilled. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114–
18.
93
In 1991, the Congress Office of Technology reported that canine detection is the one of the most widely
used, accurate, durable, and flexible system available for detecting illegal drugs and explosives.
Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort, (1991), Congress Office of Technology, OTA-ISC-481.
94
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
95
See Place, 462 U.S. at 706–07; Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *4–*9.
96
Paul B. Jennings, Origin and History of Security and Detector Dogs, in Canine Sports Medicine and
Surgery, 17 (Mark F. Bloomberg, Jon F. Dee, Robert A. Taylor eds. (1988); see also The Military Working
Dog History at http://www.militaryworkingdog.com/history. Only two units of detection dogs were
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widespread in the military, the army began training dogs to detect drug possession among
its servicemen.97 Civil law enforcement warmed to the idea as well, beginning with the
United States Customs Service in 1970,98 and quickly spreading to all levels of law
enforcement involved in drug interdiction.99
The first reported case in which a drug-detection dog was used to establish
probable cause was a general army court-martial in 1972.100 After quoting an extensive
amount of testimony from the dog’s handler as to the reliability (and asserted infallibility)

activated, and they ended up performing poorly under battle conditions – a surprise given the successful use
of military dogs performing other wartime tasks such as tracking, scouting, and sentry duties. Jennings at
17–18.
97
Id. at 18.
98
Max A. Hansen, United States v. Solis: Have the Government’s Supersniffers Come Down With a Case
of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410, 414 n.22 (1976). In 1974 the U.S.
Customs Service dogs screened over 90,000 vehicles, 4 million mail packages, and over 6 million units of
cargo, resulting in the seizure of over 22,000 pounds of marijuana and 38 pounds of heroin and cocaine. Id.
at 416 n.31.
99
See Vicki Hyman Kenner, Pooches Are Put Through Their Paces, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans,
L.A.), Sept. 18, 1998, at B1 (“Large law enforcement agencies often have entire divisions with state-of-theart facilities devoted to canine work, but smaller cities and towns may have only one or two canine officers.
. . .”)
The dog breeds most frequently used by the federal government are German shephards, Belgian
malinois, English springer spaniels, labrador retrievers, and golden retrievers. The United States
Department of Agriculture uses Beagles at airports to sniff for contraband. J. Christopher Hain, World
Howling for Bomb Dogs: Shortage of Trained Dogs Snags Security Efforts at PBIA, Elsewhere, Palm
Beach Post A1 (Nov. 30, 2001). Smaller dogs such as beagles and terriers have proven themselves to be
very effective, but may not be as practical for use in the field. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra, Criminal Law:
Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations: Finding the Balance, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1109 (1992)
(arguing that because smaller dogs have “superior sensory abilities,” and because larger dogs can be unduly
intimidating, police forces should be required to use only smaller, “non-threatening breeds” for canine
sniffs); Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85
KY L.J. 405, footnote 41 (1997) (agreeing that smaller dogs have better olfactory abilities, but noting that
law enforcement agents prefer larger breeds because they can traverse obstacles more effectively).
The training of a narcotics detection dog takes approximately 2-6 weeks; however, training a
hu
man being to properly handle the dog and interpret its reactions takes approximately 10 -16 weeks. See
id. at 412.
100
United States v. Unrue, 46 C.M.R. 882, 886 (United States A.C.M.R. 1972). The Fifth Circuit in the
same year heard a case in which a drug-detection dog was used by United States Customs on some
footlockers that were being shipped from Jamaica, but the Fourth Amendment concerns were obviously not
present in that case. See United States v. Johnson, 469 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1972). Also earlier that year,
the United States Air Force Court of Military Review heard a case in which a dog was used to provide
probable cause for a search, but explicitly refused to rule on whether the alert alone was sufficient to
provide probable cause. United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 418, 434 (United States A.F.C.M.P. 1972).
Evidence of identification of a defendant by bloodhounds had been admissible for decades prior to 1972.
See Annotation, 18 ALR3d 1221; 1 Wigmore, Evidence, 177 (3d ed 1940).
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of the dog,101 the United States Army Court of Military Review held that the dog’s alert
alone was sufficient to give the law enforcement agents probable cause,102 and on appeal
the United States Court of Military Appeals agreed.103
The first reported civilian case followed closely afterwards, when in 1974 the
D.C. Circuit upheld the issuance of a warrant based on a canine sniff of footlockers in a
baggage terminal.104 In a precursor to Place and Caballes, the defendant claimed that the
canine sniff itself was a search, and the court summarily dismissed the argument as
“frivolous.”105 Between 1974 and 1983, when Place was decided, every circuit court to
address the question held that drug detection dogs were sufficient to provide probable
cause, although they were split as to whether or not the use of the dog itself implicated
the Fourth Amendment.106 In 1977, the Supreme Court itself decided United States v.

101

The dog’s handlers described how the dog “Rex” alerted, the intensive training regimen the dog had
undergone, and numerous examples of his successfully locating drugs. The Sergeant in charge of drug
detection dogs at the fort characterized Rex as “the best dog…in the Southeastern United States.” Unrue,
46 C.M.R. at 883–86.
102
Id. at 886.
103
United States v. Unrue, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 466, 470 (1973).
104
United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Since drug detection dogs were not in
general use at the time for general crime prevention, the local law enforcement had to borrow a drug
detection dog and its handler from the United States Customs Service. Id. In finding the dog “Chief” to be
reliable, the court merely noted that the handler testified that Chief had accurately found drugs ten times or
more, and had been “consistently reliable” over the two years he had worked at customs. Id.
105
Id.
106
See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963, 966 (1st Cir. 1976) (positive dog sniff provides
probable cause; silent on the question of whether the sniff itself implicates the Fourth Amendment); United
States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1975) (positive dog sniff provides probable cause; dog sniff
allowed in this case because there was “reliable information that reasonably triggered the surveillance”);
United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 11–12 (4th Cir, 1980) (positive dog sniff provides probable cause;
implies that some reasonable suspicion is necessary before a drug-detection dog can be used);; United
States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1981) (positive dog sniff provides probable cause; use of
the dog does not implicate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d 1078, 1080 (6th Cir.
1983) (same); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir. 1980) (positive dog sniff provides probable
cause; implies that some reasonable suspicion is necessary before a drug-detection dog can be used);
(United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1333–34 (1982) (holding that a dog sniff is a Fourth Amendment
intrusion which must be justified by “articulable suspicion”); United States v. McCranie, 703 F.2d 1213,
1218 (10th Cir.1983) (positive dog sniff provides probable cause; law enforcement must have “some
suspicion” before using a drug-detection dog).
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Chadwick,107 in which a drug detection dog was used, and implied that the alert by the
dog would have been sufficient to obtain a warrant.108 Surprisingly, the Court did not
even discuss the question of whether the use of the dog constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment,109 and the case was cited in Place only for the well-settled
proposition that an individual has a protected privacy interest in the contents of his or her
luggage.110
Place itself, of course, stated (albeit in dicta) that the use of a drug-detection dog
did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.111 In the twenty-two years between Place and
Caballes, the lower courts have almost uniformly held that a canine sniff is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment.112 Many of these cases simply cite to Place, sometimes
quoting its relatively vague explanation,113 but a relatively consistent pattern of holdings
has been somewhat muddled by the different rationales that courts use to support this
conclusion.114 In fact, numerous courts have upheld suspicionless canine sniffs without
resorting to the binary search doctrine—a doctrine that is relatively recent and somewhat

107

433 U.S. 1 (1977).
Id. at 15. The Court noted that “on this record the issuance of a warrant by a judicial officer was
reasonably predictable….”) However, the Court held that even though the law enforcement agents had
probable cause after the canine sniff, they should have sought and acquired a warrant before opening the
luggage. Id. at 15-16.
109
The law enforcement agents arguably had articulable facts to justify the canine sniff (for example,
agents observed talcum powder leaking from the baggage, which is commonly used to mask the smell of
marijuana, and the defendants fit a “drug courier profile” (id. at 3)), but certainly not probable cause.
However, the Court did not address the issue at all, presumably assuming that the use of the drug detection
dog did not even implicate the Fourth Amendment.
110
Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (1983). Indeed, Place did not cite any authority for its decision that a canine
sniff is not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
111
Id at 706-07.
112
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1991). For an overview of
the canine sniff case law during this period, see generally 150 ALR F3d. 399, §2a.
113
See, e.g., Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 788 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361,
1363 (8th Cir. 1992);
114
See infra notes 115–161 and accompanying text. This near-uniformity of decisions in the lower courts
made it somewhat surprising that the Court granted certiorari in the Caballes case—and then issued a
decision that was so narrowly tailored that it did little more than reiterate what had already been established
in Place and Jacobsen twenty years ago.
108
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controversial.115 In the wake of Place, courts which chose not to rely on the binary
search doctrine offered two other justifications for allowing canine sniffs without
probable cause: the “plain smell” doctrine, and the “non-intrusive” method of the sniff
itself.116 Before Caballes was decided, it was possible that the Supreme Court could have
retreated from the binary search language of Place and Jacobsen and settled on one of
these justifications instead to explain the constitutionality of suspicionless canine sniffs.
D.

Other possible rationales to support canine sniffs

The binary search doctrine is not without its critics. The most common critique of
the doctrine is that it seeks to legitimize a search based on ex post facto examination of
what the police find as a result of the search.117 Of course, if this is what the binary
search doctrine implied, it would indeed be flawed, but a true binary search is defined not
by what the search actually detects, but rather what it is able to detect. Thus, there is no
need to conduct an ex post facto examination of the search; a court can determine
whether a surveillance procedure is indeed a binary search without needing to know
what, if anything, the surveillance detected.

115

See Harris, supra note 16,at 37 –45 (“Simply put, the reasoning that undergirds both Place and Jacobsen
is wrong and dangerous; its implications are nothing less than frightening.”)
116
See 150 A.L.R. Fed. 399, § 3 (“Most federal courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches for Fourth
Amendment purposes, because they are only minimally intrusive, and because they occur in places where
individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. There is no privacy interest in the odor that
emanates from even a closed container because that odor is accessible to the public. Moreover, drug sniffs
do not require the opening of, or identify the contents of, containers; they merely indicate the presence or
absence of drugs.”)
117
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16,at 41 (“It seems almost too basic a proposition to restate, but what police
find as a result of the search can play no part in determining whether the officers violated the Fourth
Amendment in conducting the search.”) Professor Harris also brings up another criticism: namely, when
Congress or state legislatures declare certain substances or activities to be illegal, they are not necessarily
saying that individuals have no privacy interests in conducting those activities. Id. at 40-41. Although this
is true, the binary search doctrine is not based on the legislative intent behind the criminal laws in question,
but rather the reach of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment
protects only “legitimate” activity, and not illegal activity. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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We have also seen Justices of the Supreme Court reluctant to embrace the binary
search doctrine: recall Justice Brennan’s dissent in Jacobsen in which he describes the
“Orwellian world” that will arise when law enforcement develops long-distance
“narcotics detectors” that can see through walls, car doors, and clothes.118 However, it is
worth noting that police officers today, without such devices, intrude onto our privacy in
myriad ways which are constitutional but still intrusive: they observe our actions in
public places watching for “suspicious” activity; they employ undercover officers and
informants to infiltrate our private activities in search of illegal activity; they might pull
us over or stop us on the street based on a hunch, a pretext, or even a racially-motivated
profile. A true binary search, properly utilized by law enforcement, would in many ways
be far less intrusive of individuals’ privacy, since it would provide law enforcement
officers with extremely limited information about our private lives.
However, given the reluctance on the part of some commentators and judges to
accept the binary search doctrine, it is not surprising that some courts have looked to
other justifications to support the Place/Jacobsen holding. Some courts have relied upon
the “plain smell” doctrine, while others have focused on the lack of physical intrusiveness
involved in these searches.
1.

The “plain smell” doctrine.

Some courts which have approved canine sniffs have relied upon the “plain
smell” doctrine – that the dog is merely an “extension” of the police officer, enhancing
his or her senses rather like a flashlight or binoculars help the officer to use his or her
plain sight.119 Therefore, since the police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment

118
119

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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by merely detecting a smell that is emanating into a public area (or into a private area
where the officer is lawfully present),120 the detection of the scent should not become a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment merely because the officer uses a device (in this
case a dog) to enhance his or her ability to detect the scent.121
This line of cases distinguishes between “sense-enhancing” and “sense-replacing”
devices, stating that the former are constitutional because they merely assist the law
enforcement officer in a more accurate detection of what he or she could already detect,
while the latter give the officer more information than could otherwise be detected by his
or her five senses.122
Although intuitively appealing, this approach has serious flaws; most significant
among them being the impossibility of drawing a line between “sense-enhancing” and
“sense-replacing” devices. Obviously at some point a “sense-enhancing” device becomes
so ultrasensitive that any court would concede that it is providing the officer with
information not detectable by his or her normal senses: a miniature microphone planted
next to the defendant’s phone, for example, or a thermal imager across the street from the
defendant’s house. Both of these are examples of devices which merely amplify inputs
that human beings can already sense, but in both cases the courts have held that the use of
120
See Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (smell can be sufficient to provide probable cause providing
law enforcement officer is qualified to identify the odor and the odor is distinctive enough).
121
See, e.g., United States v. Bronstein, 421 F.2d 459, 461 (2nd Cir. 1975) (noting that if a police officer
had smelled the drugs, the sniffing would not be a search, and that the same analysis applied when a drug
dog conducted the sniffing); United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 21, 22 (2nd Cir. 1981) (a sniff of the air
does not become impermissible merely because it was done by a dog instead of a human being); United
States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980) (dog sniff is no more a search than a sniff by the human
agent); Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 1982).
122
See, e.g., Place, 462 U.S. at 719–20 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan disagreed with the
majority’s dicta that use of a drug-detection dog was not a search, and he cited the sense-enhancing/sensereplacing distinction as a reason—although he argued that drug-detection dogs were in fact sensereplacing. Justice Brennan distinguished a drug-detection dog from an electronic homing device used in
an earlier case because the homing device did nothing more than “allow the police to do more efficiently
what they could do using their own senses,” while the drug-detection dog added “a new and previously
unobtainable dimension to human perception. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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these items was a “search.”123 Most recently, the Kyllo case itself helped put this
unscientific and legally dubious distinction to rest. The government attorney in Kyllo had
argued that the thermal imager used by the officers was only a “sense-enhancer,” since it
merely sensed heat that was emanating from the house, and heat was something that any
human could detect on his or her own.124 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
holding that it was irrelevant whether the device was detecting heat that came through the
wall (which could theoretically be felt by a human being on the outside) or whether the
device was sending signals that pierced the wall to gather information about the inside of
the house (which could not possibly be detected by a human being on the outside).125
Canine sniffs themselves are an excellent example of the problems in making this
distinction, for the simple reason that courts cannot agree as to whether a canine sniff is
sense-replacing (because it gives the officials information about “something entirely
hidden from human senses”)126 or sense-enhancing.127 Like the thermal imager in Kyllo,
a canine sniff tells the law enforcement officer private information that he or she could
not possibly detect with his or her own naked senses. Thus, to claim that canine sniffs
are not “searches” because they merely enhance the senses of the law enforcement officer
is a doctrinally weak argument. As a hypothetical, imagine a mechanical device that
could record the most minute traces of scent in the air around a person or a home and
identify the scent for the officer. An officer using this device could conceivably know
what the subject had eaten for breakfast, what he or she was carrying inside a purse or
123

See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (2001).
Oral Argument at 12–13, 30, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
125
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–6.
126
See, e.g., State v. Elkins, 354 N.E. 2d 716, 718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
127
See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 1982) (comparing the
use of a drug detection dog to a flashlight and accepting canine sniffs in principle as allowed under a “plain
smell” rule).
124
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bag, or even the scent (and thus perhaps eventually the names) of the people who had
been intimate with the subject over the past twenty-four hours. Would all this be
permissible simply because the officer was only detecting the scent pattern of the
molecules in the air around the individual, and scent happens to be one of the five natural
senses that the officer possesses? If the machine used another method to analyze the
molecules in the air around the subject – a complex chemical analysis unrelated to the
molecules’ scent pattern, for example – would the search then suddenly become
objectionable simply because of the method used to identify those molecules?
In short, what makes the canine sniff more palatable than other searches is not
that the dog happens to be using his sense of smell in searching for narcotics (a detection
method that law enforcement agents are coincidentally allowed to use themselves without
having to show probable cause); it is the fact that the dog is trained to only react to the
presence of narcotics, a contraband item. As a result, the law enforcement officer cannot
possibly learn anything about the subject or item in question other than the presence or
absence of the contraband.
2.

The “non-intrusive” nature of the search

Canine sniffs have also been justified under the theory that they are not physically
invasive and therefore do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.128 This rationale is even
more suspect than the “plain smell” justification, since it focuses on the actions of the law
enforcement officer rather than the type of information that is acquired. Although courts
do (and should) care about the level of physical invasion when they are determining
whether a seizure has occurred (and the degree of the seizure if one in fact has

128

See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir. 1992).
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occurred),129 this factor should not be relevant in determining whether or not a search has
occurred. Obviously in evaluating the propriety of an investigative procedure, a court
must ensure both that the search was valid and the seizure was permissible, but it is
important not to conflate the two analyses.
Unfortunately there is a significant amount of Supreme Court precedence behind
this doctrine, though most of it has fallen into disrepute.130 In the early days of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court relied upon the “trespass” doctrine, which allowed
law enforcement officers to investigate in any manner they wanted, as long as they did
not physically invade the defendant’s property.131 In Katz, the Court famously rejected
the trespass doctrine,132 focusing instead on whether the search violated the defendant’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”133 This shift was not only an important defeat for
formalism, it also guaranteed that the Fourth Amendment would remain relevant as
newer and less physically invasive methods of surveillance were developed. If the
trespass doctrine remained good law today, law enforcement agents could
constitutionally conduct a broad range of surveillance by pointing parabolic microphones
at homes, intercepting and copying e-mails, eavesdropping on phone calls, and detecting
129

See infra notes 235–239 and accompanying text.
As noted below, Katz and Kyllo have gone a long way towards eliminating the “physical invasiveness”
of the surveillance method in determining whether a search has occurred. See infra notes 132–135 and
accompanying text.
131
See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (upholding the use of a device to tap
telephone wires because the device was affixed to wires outside the defendant’s house); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (upholding the use of a “slap-microphone” that was attached to a wall adjoining
the defendant’s office because the surveillance device did not physically invade the defendant’s property);
United States v. Silverman, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (precluding the use of a “spike-microphone” that was
drilled through an adjoining wall and made contact with the defendant’s property because it violated the
defendant’s property rights).
132
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The federal agents in Katz attached a microphone to
the outside of a phone booth that the defendant used, so there was clearly no violation of the defendant’s
property rights. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
133
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also noted that the presence or absence of “physical
intrusion” should not be the primary inquiry in determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred.
130
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the amount of heat that was being emitted from houses.134 These technologies (and
others that are currently being developed) would allow law enforcement to acquire nearly
unlimited amounts of private information about the public without every “physically
invading” a protected area. In this sense Katz’s rejection of the trespass doctrine was
extraordinarily prescient: although the idea of a device that could “see through walls”
was probably mere science fiction at the time Katz was decided, the “reasonable
expectations” test was integral to the Kyllo decision precluding the warrantless use of
thermal imagers on the defendant’s home.135
There are unwelcome signs that the Court has not totally abandoned the “physical
invasion” element in determining whether a search has occurred. “Intrusiveness” is
frequently cited as a factor in evaluating a search. In some cases, courts use the term
“intrusive” to mean the degree to which a search intrudes onto private and protected
information.136 However, occasionally a court uses the term “intrusive” to mean the level
of physical invasiveness, and cites the level of physical invasiveness as a factor in
deciding whether the search is permissible.137 Most recently, in Bond v. United States,138
134

Some (but not all) of these activities are now regulated or precluded by statute, and presumably would
be even if the Fourth Amendment allowed them. See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2000) (“Title III”
regulations which set strict standards on law enforcement can tapping a phone, and Electronic
Communications and Privacy Act amendments which cover electronic communications). Thus, many of
these surveillance methods would likely still be illegal even if the trespass doctrine remained – but only
until Congress decided to change the law.
135
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
136
See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) (in assessing the
constitutionality of attaching a video camera to a pole to monitor the defendant’s backyard, the court notes
that “the government’s intrusion is not minimal.”)
137
See, e.g., Powers v. Plumas Unified School Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
dog sniffing students in close proximity violates the Fourth Amendment because “the level of intrusiveness
is greater when the dog is permitted to sniff a person than when a dog sniffs unattended luggage.”) The
Powers court concluded that this greater level of “intrusiveness” meant that the canine sniff constituted a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, because the use of the dog was “offensive” and thus infringed on
the students’ “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. The link between the “offensiveness” of the method
used by law enforcement and the degree to which someone’s reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed
is not clear; however, the link between offensiveness and the degree of seizure is quite strong. See also
Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F.2d 470, 479–80 (5th Cir. 1982) (drug detection
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the Supreme Court held that the squeezing of the defendant’s bag in an overhead bin on a
bus was an unconstitutional search, not because the officer impermissibly obtained
information that the defendant reasonable expected to be private, but rather because
“[p]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual
inspection.”139
We have already seen how Place itself looked in part to the level of physical
invasiveness involved in a canine sniff, approving the sniff partially because of the less
intrusive method of the search.140 Jacobsen immediately clarified the Place doctrine,
ignoring the “intrusiveness” aspect of the language141—but many lower courts continued
to cite both the binary nature and the non-intrusiveness of the canine sniff in evaluating
its constitutionality.142 The “non-intrusiveness” factor also resurfaced in the Supreme
Court in Indianapolis v. Edmond,143 a 2000 case which tangentially involved canine
sniffs. In Edmond, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of random checkpoints
meant to check passing cars for narcotics.144 The Court struck down the use of the

dog sniffing an individual is a “search” due to the “degree of personal intrusiveness,” since it is offensive
and embarrassing.); United States v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2003) (use of drug detection dog
was found not to be a search in part because the method used was “non-intrusive;” the dog was four to five
feet away from the individuals being sniffed).
138
529 U.S. 334 (2000).
139
Id. at 337.
140
Place, 462 U.S. at 707. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text. In looking to the “less intrusive
manner” of the canine search, the Place Court might not have been concerned with physical invasiveness,
but may in fact only have been re-stating the binary nature of the test using confusingly broad language.
According to the Court, the reason the manner was “unobtrusive” was that it “does not require opening of
the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public
view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage.” Id. Whatever the
Place Court meant by the term “less intrusive manner,” the Jacobsen decision – and now the Caballes
decision – made it clear that the only reason a canine sniff does not implicate the Fourth Amendment’s
restrictions on searches is because it is a binary search, not because it is physically non-invasive.
141
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 n.24 (emphasis in the original). See also supra note 75 and accompanying
text.
142
See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir. 1992).
143
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
144
Id. at 40–42.
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checkpoints as an unconstitutional seizure,145 and in dicta it cited Place for the
proposition that the use of the narcotics-detection dog itself did not transform the seizure
into a search.146 The Edmond Court went on to undo the good work done in Jacobsen by
justifying the Place doctrine for two reasons: first, the sniff “is not designed to disclose
any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics,” and second, “an
exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car.”147
One of the hopes for the Caballes decision was that it would clarify the meaning
of the Place doctrine once and for all – are canine sniffs non-searches merely because of
their binary nature, or does the degree (or absence) of physical intrusion also play a role
in determining whether a search has occurred? Luckily, this was one of the few
questions—perhaps the only question—thatCaballes answered unequivocally.148
This is not to say that the level of physical intrusiveness is completely irrelevant
to the question of whether or not a surveillance procedure is constitutional. The duration,
degree, and nature of the physical intrusion are key elements in determining whether or
not a seizure has occurred – indeed, this has been and will continue to be one of the key
limitations for the use of canine sniffs and other binary searches.149 But it is critical to
unlink the seizure question from the search question, and for a court to evaluate both the
search aspect of a surveillance procedure, and then independently evaluate whether or not
the procedure constitutes an unconstitutional seizure.150 Using physical invasiveness as a
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Id. at 44.
Id. at 40.
147
Id.
148
See infra notes 175–179 and accompanying text.
149
See infra notes 235–239 and accompanying text.
150
The Fifth Circuit had the correct approach in a pre-Place case: “We must analyze the question of
whether dog sniffing is a search in terms of whether the sniffing offends reasonable expectations of
privacy, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), and must look at the
degree of intrusiveness of the challenged action to determine whether it is the type of activity that can be
146
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factor for determining whether a search occurred is analogous to the old, discredited
“trespass” doctrine of Olmstead, focusing on how the search is conducted rather than on
the type of information it reveals. The difference in approach is more than just academic
hair-splitting: if the absence of physical intrusion is seen as a critical component of the
search evaluation, then newer technologies (and many existing technologies) that produce
non-binary results could conceivably be accepted merely because they are completely
non-invasive. Should a wiretap of a phone be considered less of a “search” because it
does not physically intrude onto the property of an individual? Is a thermal imager (or a
more sophisticated X-Ray device) less of a “search” because it is not physically invasive?
If courts do not keep the search question and the seizure question distinct, there is a real
danger that surveillance methods which reveal extremely private information will become
more palatable merely because they are not physically invasive.151
A pair of cases from the First Circuit illustrate the dangers of conflating the two
concepts. In United States v. Quinn,152 the court considered a twenty-five minute traffic
stop under Terry principles, and decided the police in the case possessed “strong grounds
for suspicion” which justified such a long delay.153 The Quinn court then briefly
considered the propriety of the canine sniff itself, and concluded (rather dubiously) that
based on Place, the law enforcement agents needed “reasonable suspicion” in order to

tolerated in a free society. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).” Horton v.
Goose Creek Independent School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476-77 (1982).
151
This danger is especially acute because non-invasive searches do not feel like a search; thus, these
searches might seem more acceptable to lay citizens, even if they reveal intimate details of a person’s home
or possessions.
152
815 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1987).
153
Id. at 158.
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conduct a canine sniff.154 Since the seizure had already been separately analyzed, it
appeared that the court was holding that the search itself required reasonable suspicion.
A few years later, in United States v. Rodriguez-Morales,155 the same court was
faced with a case in which a car had been legally impounded for non-criminal reasons.
The officers lacked even a reasonable suspicion to justify a search of the car,156 but they
conducted a canine sniff of the car, which indicated the presence of narcotics. The court
upheld the canine sniff of the car under these circumstances,157 arguing somewhat
unpersuasively in a footnote that the reasonable suspicion requirement from Quinn could
be distinguished: “In Quinn, the central issue involved the legality of temporarily
detaining the object to be sniffed—a detention for which reasonable suspicion was
required. The Quinn language, therefore, must be read in that context.”158 Thus, the First
Circuit somewhat belatedly came to the conclusion that the legality of the seizure must be
analyzed separately from the legality of the search.
The Illinois Supreme Court made this same mistake in the Caballes case. Its
application of the Terry doctrine to the propriety of the traffic stop itself was proper, and
had it continued to examine only the seizure aspects of the canine sniff under the Terry
doctrine, the analysis would have been appropriate. Instead, the court held that the
canine sniff “unjustifiably broadened the scope of an otherwise routine traffic stop,” thus
violating the Fourth Amendment, merely because the use of the dog broadened the scope
of the stop.159 In so doing, the court conflated the search aspects of the canine sniff
(which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment) with the potentially illegal seizure
154

Id. at 159.
929 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1991).
156
Id. at 788–89.
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Id. at 789.
158
Id. at 789 n.4.
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Caballes, 207 Ill.2d at 509.
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aspects of a canine sniff: extended delay of the stop, intimidation or humiliation caused
by the use of the dog, or perhaps the physical invasiveness of the canine sniff. If the
court had argued that, under the facts of the case, the use of the dog caused unreasonable
delay, or unreasonable embarrassment or humiliation, or was unreasonably invasive, the
canine sniff could have been held unconstitutional under Terry.160 However, the court
did not point to any of these variables – probably because under the facts of the case, the
canine sniff took no extra time and was minimally intimidating and invasive.161
Thus, by the time Caballes reached the Supreme Court, the binary search doctrine
itself was at a crossroads: it had been given a rocky birth in Place, gotten a large boost
from Jacobsen, but was by no means secure—lower courts were looking to other reasons
to justify Place, and even the Supreme Court in Edmond was casting doubt as to the
future of the doctrine.

IV.

The Caballes Decision and What It Means for Binary Searches
A.

The facts of Caballes

On November 12, 1998, Roy Caballes was driving through the rain from Chicago
to Las Vegas on Interstate 80.162 In his trunk was a large quantity of marijuana with a
street value of over $250,000.163 At approximately 5:04, Caballes was pulled over by

160

This was the opinion expressed by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in the Caballes case. See Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *28 –*31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 194198 and accompanying text.
161
The extent of acceptable delay and/or invasiveness is a key question for the future application of binary
searches, one that the Supreme Court failed to address, see infra note 180-188 and accompanying text; and
one that this Article attempts to define, see infra notes 230–245.
162
People v. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d 504, 506; 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (2003). Mr. Caballes was driving six
miles an hour above the speed limit. Id.
163
Id. at 508, 203.
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Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette for speeding.164 Trooper Gillette called the stop in
to the dispatcher, and then proceeded to process the speeding ticket.165 A second State
Trooper, Craig Graham of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team, heard
Gillette’s radio transmission and decided to drive out to the location with his trained
drug-sniffing dog.166 Just under ten minutes later, Graham arrived at the scene and his
dog began sniffing around the outside of Caballes’ car.167 Within a minute, the dog had
alerted to the trunk and the Troopers had probable cause to conduct a search.168 They
recovered the marijuana and charged Caballes with one count of cannabis trafficking.169
Caballes was found guilty after a bench trial and sentenced to twelve years in
prison.170 He appealed the case, arguing that the police were required to have a
“reasonable articulable suspicion” before they could conduct the canine sniff.171 The
appellate court disagreed, but the Illinois Supreme Court accepted the case and reversed
the conviction.172 According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the canine sniff “unjustifiably
enlarge[ed] the scope of a routine traffic stop,” and thus required “specific and articulable
facts” to justify its use.173 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case on April 5,
2004, stating the question presented as “whether the Fourth Amendment requires

164
See Illinois v. Caballes, No. 03-923, Brief of Arkansas and 27 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, 2003 U.S. Briefs 923 (June 29, 2004) at *1 [hereinafter “Caballes State Amici”]. Trooper
Gillette called the dispatcher at 5:06 pm to check the defendant’s plates, so it is reasonable to assume the
defendant was pulled over a few minutes prior to that time.
165
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *2.
166
Id. at ____, *2–*3.
167
Caballes State Amici, supra note 164, at *2 –*3. It was 5:15 when Trooper Gillette changed the activity
code of the stop to a narcotics detention; thus, the dog alerted at some point before 5:15.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 3.
170
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *3. Caballes was also fined $256,136, which was the street
value of the marijuana. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 506; 802 N.E.2d at 203.
171
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *3.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog during a legitimate
traffic stop.”174
B.

What the Court accomplished: affirming the binary search doctrine

Given what is at stake for the efficiency of law enforcement activities and the
potential for widespread intrusions onto our privacy (not to mention the rarity of a
Supreme Court decision on the subject), the Caballes decision is particularly
disappointing. The majority opinion is barely over four pages long, and fails to cite Terry
or any other seizure case. The only helpful portion of the opinion is the resounding
affirmation of the binary search doctrine, as initially set forth by Place and clarified and
refined by Jacobsen: the Court confirmed that “official conduct that does not
‘compromise any legitimate interest in property’ is not a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment.”175 Like Jacobsen, it re-interpreted Place by stating that the reason a
canine sniff by a drug detection dog did not constitute a search was because it “’discloses
only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.’”176 The Caballes Court
ignored the “less intrusive manner” aspect of the Place rationale and thus consigned it to
irrelevance—or, more accurately, disassociated the level of intrusiveness in the method
of the search from the question of whether the surveillance procedure is a search under
the Fourth Amendment. As noted below, the level of intrusiveness is relevant to the
question of whether a seizure has occurred—but this inquiry must be independent of the
question of whether the investigative procedure was a binary search.
174

Id. at *4. In addition to the briefs by the parties, amicus briefs were filed on the side of the government
by the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the United States
Department of Justice, and the Attorneys General of 28 other states. The American Civil Liberties Union
and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed amicus briefs on the side of the defendant.
175
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ___, 2005 LEXIS at *6 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984)).
176
Id. at *8 (quoting Place, 464 U.S. at 707).
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Finally, the Court buttressed the binary search doctrine by tying it to the language
in Kyllo,177 its most significant recent Fourth Amendment case. As the Court noted:
Critical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact that the device was capable of
detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details in a home, such as “at
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” The
legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain
private is categorically different from respondent’s hopes or expectation
concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog
sniff…that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.178
In short, the other rationales that lower courts had proposed to justify the
indiscriminate use of canine sniffs—the “plain smell” doctrine and the “non-intrusive
method” rationale179—were rejected, and the binary search doctrine is now firmly
entrenched in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
C.

What the Court failed to accomplish: proper definition and limitation

of binary searches
Now that the court has cleared the way for the use of indiscriminate binary
searches, two questions come to mind. The first is definitional: What, exactly, is a
“binary search”? An easy definition is that it is a surveillance method that only reveals
the presence or absence of illegal activity, and nothing more. But that definition is too
easy, as it turns out: it does not help law enforcement officers and judges in the real world
decide whether a given surveillance method is accurate enough to find refuge in the
Caballes holding. What if a device or a surveillance technique accurately reveals nothing
more than the presence or absence of illegal activity 99% of the time—but 1% of the time
it mistakenly alerts, thereby triggering a full-scale search of an individual who is not
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533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at *8–*9 (citations omitted).
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See supra notes 115–161 and accompanying text.
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involved in any sort of illegal activity? This first question deals with the accuracy of the
surveillance.
The second question returns to the issue of “intrusiveness.” Although most courts
have properly de-linked the question of physical invasiveness from the question of
whether a search has occurred, we cannot ignore the seizure issue entirely. Law
enforcement agents may develop a binary search technique which is perfectly accurate—
but which requires the subject to submit to a five-minute wait, or perhaps undergo a
humiliating or intimidating procedure. Although the process would still not be a “search”
under Caballes, it might easily be considered a seizure under Terry. This question deals
with the limitations on binary searches.
The Caballes Court briefly attempted to address the first major question
surrounding binary searches: the acceptable level of false positives. But its two-sentence
response will likely fail to convince binary search opponents and provide little
ammunition for proponents of the doctrine. After raising the question of false positives,
the Court first notes that there is nothing in the record to support the argument that “false
positives [] call into question the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to
contraband.”180 Although technically true, the Court is rather transparently dodging an
uncontroverted issue of fact: that drug-detection dogs do occasionally alert even if no
narcotics are present.181 And then the Court attempts a doctrinal justification for

180

Id. at *7 (“Although respondent argues that the error rates, particularly the existence of false positives,
call into question the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to contraband, the record contains no
evidence or findings that support his argument.”)
181
As Justice Souter noted in his dissent, the case law in the field contains ample evidence of the fallibility
of drug detection dogs. See id. at *12 - *13 (citing six lower court federal cases and the reply brief in the
Caballes case as evidence that drug detection dogs have a false positive rate as high as 60%). See also
Bird, supra note 99,at 411 -15 (noting that Rhode Island police dogs correctly alert 95-98% of the time).
How to properly measure the accuracy of drug detection dogs is yet another issue that was not discussed by
Caballes majority, and in many lower courts it is unclear if the “accuracy rate” of the dog in question refers
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sidestepping the issue: “Moreover, respondent does not suggest that an erroneous alert, in
and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case, the trial judge
found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to conduct a
full-blown search.”182
The Court’s logic appears to run as follows: first, a canine sniff does not implicate
the Fourth Amendment because it is a binary search—that is, it cannot possibly provide
law enforcement with any information in which the subject of the search has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.183 Second, assuming there could be some false positives in this
particular method of search, the false positive itself does not reveal any information in
which the subject of the search has a legitimate expectation of privacy.184 And finally,
although a false positive will invariably lead to a search which does reveal information in
which the subject has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the question whether the alert
following a canine sniff provides probable cause is separate and distinct from whether the
sniff is a “search” in the first place185—and the probable cause question is a much easier
standard to meet than the binary search standard.
This legalistic slight of hand is not sustainable. The Court’s logic would allow
the use of extremely inaccurate binary searches, as long as they were accurate enough
(50%, perhaps) to create probable cause. For example, if an automatic gun detector were
developed that could be pointed at an individual and determine with 60% accuracy
whether or not the person was carrying an illegal firearm, the Court’s logic would allow
law enforcement officers to use the device arbitrarily on individuals walking down the
to the false positive rate or the positive predictive value of the alert. See infra notes 209-213 and
accompanying text.
182
Id. at *7.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.

40
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art11

street or driving in their cars. The Court would apparently be unconcerned about the 40%
false positive rate, since the police learn nothing legitimate and private about an
individual when the machine mistakenly alerts in their case.186 Then, once the device
alerted, the 60% chance that the individual was carrying an illegal item would be more
than enough to provide probable cause to search the individual.187 The result would be
that 40% of the time, the police would be conducting an unjustified search of an
individual who had a protected interest in all the items he or she was carrying. In short,
by separating the binary search question from the probable cause question, the Court is
potentially opening the door to any investigative procedure which is reliable enough to
provide probable cause, so long as the procedure itself does not provide law enforcement
any privileged information.
The Caballes Court also hints at the potential limitation that the seizure line of
cases might have on canine searches, though even the term “hints” is generous. The only
potential reference to the question comes from one sentence: “In this case, the dog sniff
was performed on the exterior of respondent’s car while he was lawfully seized for a
traffic violation.”188 This sentence implies (perhaps) that the ruling would have been
different if the dog sniff had been more physically invasive (inside the car, say, or a sniff
of the respondent himself), or if the respondent had not already been lawfully seized for
186

This might not be true, of course, if there were consistent reasons why the device came up with a false
positive, and if the law enforcement officer using the device could then deduce private, legitimate
information about the subject of the search from the false positive alone. For example, imagine a
mechanical narcotics detector which only gave a false alert when the subject of the search was carrying a
certain kind of prescription drug. If this were the case, officers who used the device regularly would learn
“protected” information from the false alerts—i.e., they would have used the device without probable cause
to discover information about legitimate (and very private) items that the person was carrying.
187
Although the Supreme Court has refused to assign a “numerically precise degree of certainty” to
determine whether or not probable cause exists, it has held that probable cause exists if there is a
“substantial basis” for concluding that there is a “probability” of criminal activity. Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
188
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *8.
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another purpose. But the sentence provides no useful guidance as to what level of
invasiveness would trigger Fourth Amendment protection; the most that can be said about
this passage is that it leaves the door open for the Court to provide in a later case the
guidelines that it should have provided in Caballes.
The dissents by Souter and Ginsburg show no such reluctance to point out the
both problems in defining binary searches and the potentially critical ways in which
Terry might limit their use. Justice Souter addressed the issue of false positives, rejecting
the majority’s creative logic which separated the binary search question from the
probable cause question.189 Since the canine sniffs “reveal undisclosed facts about
private enclosures [which are] used to justify a further and complete search of the
enclosed area,” the sniff is not in fact simply a binary search that can only reveal
information about the existence of contraband.190 Rather, it is “the first step in a process
that [given the possibility of false positives] may disclose intimate details without
revealing contraband….”191 The possibility of a false positive, therefore, distinguished
the canine sniff from the chemical test in Jacobsen, since the chemical test “would either
show with certainty that a known substance was contraband or would reveal nothing
more,” while the canine sniff lacks both the “certainty and the limit on disclosure that
may follow.”192
In other words, even Souter’s dissent accepts the theory of binary searches, but it
limits the application of the theory to cases in which the binary search provided
189

Id. at *13–*15 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter first establishes a fact which the majority was
unwilling to acknowledge: that drug dogs do indeed have error rates. Noting that the “infallible dog…is a
creature of legal fiction,” he cites six different cases in which courts have found significant error rates in
canine sniffs. Id. at *12–*13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190
Id. at *15 (Souter, J., dissenting)
191
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
192
Id. at *19 -*20 (Souter, J. dissenting).
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“certainty” of the existence of contraband. Thus, Justice Souter at least suggests an
answer to the critical question of how accurate a procedure has to be in order to be
considered a “binary search;” unfortunately, his proposed requirement of 100% accuracy
is not likely to be met by any real-life investigative method. Indeed, even the chemical
field test in Jacobsen could not provide absolute certainty, since there is always the
possibility of human error in administering the test. Thus, Justice Souter’s certainty
requirement is either an indirect rejection of the binary search doctrine or it simply begs
the question of how reliable a binary search must be before it is held to provide the
“certainty” that he requires.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focuses on the other glaring omission in the majority
opinion: what limitations (if any) are placed on canine sniffs by the Terry line of cases
defining reasonable seizures?193 Justice Ginsburg notes that Terry does not merely
require justification for the initial seizure, but further requires that the law enforcement
officer’s actions during the seizure must be “reasonable related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”194 Thus, although the
original traffic stop in Caballes was valid, Justice Ginsburg argues that the canine sniff
could still be unconstitutional if it impermissibly expanded the “scope” of the seizure.195
She then attempts to define what types of actions can impermissibly expand a seizure’s
“scope,” conceding that in this case (as with many canine sniffs), there was no undue
delay because of the use of the drug detection dog.196 She notes that a drug detection dog
can make a stop “broader” and “more adversarial,” exposing the subject to “the

193

Id. at *25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
195
Id. at *27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
196
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194
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embarrassment and intimidation of being investigated, on a public thoroughfare, for
drugs.”197 Justice Ginsburg warns that the result of not applying Terry in this context will
be “suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in
parking lots,” and “police with dogs, at long traffic lights, circl[ing] cars waiting for the
red signal to turn green.”198
Justice Ginsburg is correct, of course, in pointing out that Terry must create some
limit on the amount of “seizure” that is permissible when a binary search takes place
absent any articulable suspicion—a point which the majority does not even address.
However, Justice Ginsburg's interpretation of “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the initial interference” is quite narrow. She also does not
address an arguably more important question: assuming the canine sniff is not merely
added onto a pre-existing, justifiable seizure, what circumstances create a “seizure” in the
first place? To take her own examples, if a car is parked or stopped on its own for a long
traffic light, does the use of a drug-detection dog on the car constitute a “seizure”? What
about using a dog outside the perimeter of someone’s house? Or walking a dog along a
public sidewalk adjacent to a line of people waiting to enter a nightclub? Justice
Ginsburg seems to imply that at least some and perhaps all of these actions by law
enforcement would constitute seizures and require at least reasonable suspicion under
Terry, but aside from repeating her opinion that drug dogs are “embarrassing” and
“intimidating,” she provides no useful test for determining when using a drug dog
implicates the seizure limitations of the Fourth Amendment.
197

Id. at *28–*29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) . She also notes that a “drug-detection dog is an intimidating
animal,” and that “drug dogs are not lap dogs.” Id. at *28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 2004) (McKay, J., dissenting). As it turns out, some drugdetection dogs could be lap dogs; in fact, lap dogs (such as beagles and terriers) are in many ways better
suited to the job than larger, more intimidating dogs. See supra note 99.
198
Id. at *30–*31. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The majority’s refusal to engage the dissents on these critical points does more to
endanger the future of the binary search doctrine than the dissents themselves. For binary
searches to be successfully utilized in the future, courts will have to understand—and
clearly state—both the level of accuracy necessary before a surveillance procedure can be
considered binary, and the severity of seizure permissible before the procedure violates
the Terry principle. The final section of this Article proposes potential answers to each of
these questions.

V.

Resolving the Unanswered Questions: Defining and Limiting Binary

Searches
It will hopefully be obvious by now that in defining and limiting binary searches,
courts must look beyond canine sniffs and consider technologies that do not yet exist.
Assume the police owned a small hand-held device which detected the presence of
narcotics in any passing car, and they were able to use that device in the same manner as
a radar detector, pointing it at the highway and getting a reading from every car within
range. Such a device does, perhaps, seem extraordinarily intrusive—but it would make
many other, more intrusive and more invidious forms of investigation obsolete: pulling
over cars that fit a certain “profile”; pretextual stops based on minor traffic or safety
violations; intimidating drivers into consenting to a search during a stop; and even
roadblocks set up ostensibly to check for drunk drivers but during which officers also
look for evidence of narcotics and other contraband.199 Whether our privacy and security

199

The incentive for law enforcement officials to set up pretextual roadblocks is quite strong given the
recent decision of Edmond, in which the Supreme Court held that although it is permissible to set up
roadblocks to check for drunk drivers (see Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451
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will be better or worse off in such a scenario is open to debate; what is clear is that
Caballes has paved the way for such a device to become a reality.
Of course, the above hypothetical presents the “perfect” binary search scenario,
one which may never exist. In the real world, as reflected in the two Caballes dissents,
binary searches are vulnerable to two criticisms: the possibility of false positives, and the
intrusiveness or delay they create. The former issue raises the question of defining binary
searches: how accurate must they be before they can be considered a binary search? The
latter issue raises the question of seizures: how intrusive can they be before they
implicate Terry and therefore require some level of reasonable suspicion in order to
justify the “seizure” that they cause?
Naturally, these questions are all relative; when compared with traditional forms
of investigation, a binary search will usually be more accurate and less intrusive. But this
argument only supports the obvious point that if an officer does have sufficient
justification to conduct a search, binary searches (or quasi-binary searches) are preferable
to more traditional forms of investigation: a sweep with a hand-held metal detector is
preferable to a pat-down; a canine sniff is preferable to a police officer opening your
trunk and riffling through your belongings. In other words, if the police know specific
and articulable facts which justify a search,200 it would be better for everyone to give the
police a device that can search for weapons in a more accurate and less intrusive manner.
Likewise, if an officer has probable cause to search through your trunk, it would be
preferable (i.e., a less intrusive search and a less prolonged seizure) if she conducted the
search by simply ordering a trained drug-detection dog to sniff the outside of your car.
(1990), it is impermissible to set up roadblocks “whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing,” such as drug trafficking. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
200
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
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But of course the tantalizing promise (or ominous threat) of binary searches is that
they can be permissibly used at times when police do not possess the level of suspicion
necessary to justify a search or even a Terry-style pat-down. And to reach this level of
constitutional comfort with binary searches, those who advocate such searches must
demonstrate more than the self-evident fact that such procedures are less of a search and
less of a seizure than the old-fashioned methods; rather, binary searches must be shown
to be so accurate a search and so non-intrusive a seizure that they do not implicate the
Fourth Amendment at all.201 Such a showing would allow widespread and indiscriminate
use of the search method in question, for if it is not a search and not a seizure, it is
entirely unregulated by the Constitution.
An important initial point is that binary searches do not necessarily have to be
100% accurate202 and completely non-intrusive; in other contexts, the Fourth Amendment
allows some types of surveillance (such as plain view)203 and some types of seizures
(such as a brief stop to inquire)204 without any showing of justification. The Caballes

201

Assuming, of course that the Court continues to adhere to the current “all-or-nothing” structure of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for searches: an investigative technique either implicates the Fourth
Amendment and thus requires probable cause, or it does not implicate it and requires no showing of
suspicion at all. In Caballes, the Supreme Court was invited to create a new intermediate Terry-like
category for searches (see, e.g., People v. Caballes, 207 Ill.2d 504, 509-10; 802 N.E.2d 202, 205-5 (2003)
(Illinois Supreme Court held that a canine sniff was unconstitutional without “specific and articulable
facts” to support the sniff)), but it declined to do so. Caballes, 543 U.S. at ___, 2005 LEXIS at *7 –*8.
202
But see id. at *19–*20 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing that binary searches should not implicate the
Fourth Amendment if they provide “certainty” as to the presence of contraband).
203
See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“[I]f contraband is left in open view and is
observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate
expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”)
204
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur
simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions”); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (“Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer
some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a
criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies
himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of
objective justification” (citations omitted)). In Terry, the Court noted that “not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves “seizures” of persons. Only when the officer, by means of
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Court itself appeared to accept a certain level of inaccuracy, since it implied that a false
positive alert that did not itself reveal legitimate private information did not constitute a
search.205 But how accurate and how non-intrusive a binary search must be before it falls
off the radar screen of the Fourth Amendment? These are the critical unresolved
questions of Caballes.
A.

Accuracy
1.

Calculating error rates

The first step is to ensure that judges understand some basic principles in
measuring the error rates of binary searches. When courts evaluate the level of accuracy
attained by drug-detection dogs, they tend to conflate different concepts: success rates,
error rates, false positive rates, etc.206 Even worse, some courts look to absolute numbers
of errors instead of examining the rate of errors, which is a rather meaningless indicator
of accuracy.207 Other courts do not look to any quantitative measure at all, relying
instead on testimony from the dog’s handler that the dog has been “trained” or that there
have been “few complaints” of false positives.208 If binary searches are to become
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude
that a “seizure” has occurred.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
205
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ___, 2005 LEXIS at *7. See also supra notes 180–187 and accompanying text.
206
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the dog in
question had an “success rate” of 71%; “success rate” was calculated by dividing the total number of alerts
by the total number of true positives.).
207
See, e.g., Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 149, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (2001) (court noted that drug dog
“Moose” had been incorrect “at least ten times and possibly as many as fifty times.”)
208
See United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963 (1st. Cir 1976); United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876
(8th Cir. 1999) (“To establish the dog's reliability, the affidavit need only state the dog has been trained
and certified to detect drugs. An affidavit need not give a detailed account of the dog's track record or
education.”). See generally Dave Hunter, Common Scents: Establishing a Presumption of Reliability for
Detector Dog Teams Used in Airports in Light of the Current Terrorist Threat, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 89,
95-96 (2002) (courts usually only require the handler’s testimony that the dog is trained and reliable).
Ostensibly these courts are using this low standard simply in order to determine if the alert is sufficient to
establish probable cause, but since many courts simply adopt the Place rationale along for indiscriminate
canine sniffs without any examination of the dog’s level of accuracy, the inquiry into reliability for
probable cause becomes the de facto inquiry into the level of accuracy necessary to be considered a binary
search.
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widespread, it is imperative that courts develop a consistent and thorough procedure for
evaluating their accuracy.
As a starting point, it should be noted that the relevant measure of a binary
search’s accuracy is the rate at which it returns an incorrect positive response.209 Of
course, an inaccurate binary search might also produce a certain percentage of false
negatives, but this would not be of constitutional concern; it would simply make the
search method somewhat less efficient.210 A false negative simply means that the binary
surveillance procedure has failed to detect the actual presence of illegal activity, but a
false positive means that an innocent subject will be subjected to a search even though he
or she was not involved in any illegal activity.
There are two important points to consider in calculating the rate of incorrect
positive responses generated by a binary device. The first is the difference between the
false positive rate and the positive predictive value. A false positive rate is calculated by
dividing the number of false positives by the total number of searches conducted by the
device. The positive predictive value is calculated by dividing the total number of true
positives by the total number of positive responses returned by the device. For example,
let us assume that in the course of one year, a drug dog conducts one thousand sniffs for
narcotics, and alerts one hundred times out of the thousand. Of those one hundred
209

An “inaccurate” binary search could also be defined as a binary search that revealed a small amount of
legitimate, non-contraband information to the officer. However, the doctrinal underpinnings of Place,
Jacobsen, and Caballes strongly suggest that there is no room to compromise in this dimension of
“accuracy”: a method that reveals any amount of non-contraband information will violate the binary search
doctrine entirely by infringing on the subject’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
210
As an extreme example, assume law enforcement develops a computer software program which copies
and opens every e-mail that passes across an internet service provider, looking for illegal images of child
pornography. In order to make the software into a pure binary search, the detection algorithm would
presumably be set to alert only upon seeing the most extreme and obvious images of child pornography.
This would ensure a false positive rate of close to zero, but it would allow a lot of false negatives—cases in
which milder but still illegal child pornography escaped notice. This would make the software somewhat
less useful—it would perhaps detect only one out of every one hundred (or one thousand) images of child
pornography that it examined—but the high rate of false negatives would not affect its constitutionality.
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positive alerts, ninety are accurate and ten are false positives. This translates into a 1%
false positive rate (10 false positives out of 1,000 attempts, meaning that only 1% of
subjects are falsely accused by the dog), but a 90% positive predictive value (90 true
positives out of 100 positive responses, meaning that once the dog returns a positive
response, the law enforcement agent can only be 90% sure that contraband is actually
present). The two different measurements are significant because although the false
positive rate is constant for any given device or procedure, the positive predictive value
will vary widely depending on the actual frequency of the illegal activity that is being
investigated. In our example above, 9 out of every 100 subjects were carrying narcotics,
but if the dog were randomly sampling the general population, the number might be
closer to 9 out of 100,000. Assuming the dog still falsely alerts 1% of the time (a
consistent 1% false positive rate), he will now falsely accuse 1,000 individuals (and
correctly alert to the 9 carrying narcotics), but because there are so many fewer true
positives, the positive predictive rate would be dramatically lower: 9 out of 1,009, or
0.9%. In other words, if the illegal activity being searched for is very rare (or at least
very rare among the pool of subjects being searched), the vast number of innocent
subjects will inflate the absolute number of false positives, and make the binary search
much less accurate. Thus, when courts begin to set guidelines for how reliable a
surveillance technique before it can be classified as a binary search, they should be
suspicious of low “false positive” rates.
As an example, consider a piece of software that searches for child pornography
by reading through e-mails passing across an internet service provider or by invading the
hard drives of home computers. When it detects an e-mail or a file that appears to
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contain child pornography, the software would alert a human operator with nothing more
than the name of the subject who sent or owned the file. The human operator would then
use this positive alert to acquire a warrant to seize and search the subject’s computer files.
Under the Caballes doctrine, this procedure would conceivably be considered a binary
search, since it provides the user with no information beyond whether or not an
individual is engaged in illegal activity. As a binary device, law enforcement agents
could send the software sniffing through e-mails and personal hard disks without
limitation.
But how accurate is this hypothetical piece of software? Law enforcement agents
might boast that it has an impressively low .01% false positive rate, but if it reads through
one million e-mails and files over the course of a year, and only ten of those million
actually contain child pornography, the software will alert to one hundred and ten
subjects over the course of the year, and only 9% of those alerts will be accurate. In the
other 91% of cases, law enforcement officers will be granted a warrant to read through an
e-mail or computer file that contains nothing but innocent material in which the owner
has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy.
Perhaps this is an acceptable level. Certainly today law enforcement agents rely
upon less-than-perfect methods in seeking probable cause, and in so doing they end up
conducting searches of innocent individuals. For example, they may act on a tip from an
informant which ends up being incorrect, or they may seek a warrant after observing
activity that appears to be suspicious but is actually innocent. It would be absurd—and
unrealistic—to require absolute certainty from binary searches. But courts should
understand the implications of the reliability numbers that they are given.
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The second, related point is how these numbers would be affected if law
enforcement officers began using binary searches indiscriminately. Today, even though
law enforcement officers have the right to use canine sniffs without any level of
suspicion, the expense and relative scarcity of drug-detection dogs mean that an officer is
unlikely to call in a canine unit unless she already has some suspicion—perhaps merely a
hunch—that the subject is carrying narcotics.211 This discrimination increases the
proportion of individuals in the pool who actually are carrying narcotics, thus increasing
the positive predictive rate (assuming a consistent false positive rate).
In other words, if law enforcement officers use binary searches indiscriminately,
without relying on reasonable suspicion or any other indicators that illegal activity may
be present, they will decrease the positive predictive rate of their binary device.212 Thus,
although Caballes gives law enforcement agents the right in theory to utilize binary
searches with impunity, in practice such indiscriminate use will gratuitously increase the
rate at which the binary search infringes on individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights. As of
now, the courts have not set out a required level of accuracy—indeed, the two sentences
that the Caballes Court devotes to this issue would allow for very inaccurate binary
devices, so long as they were reliable enough to provide probable cause.213 However,
once binary searches become more common—and perhaps once they begin taking forms
more ominous and alien than the familiar drug-detection dog—courts are likely to
demand greater levels of accuracy. Until the technologies begin to approach 100%
211

This is mostly due to a lack of resources: since drug-detection dogs (and their handlers) are expensive, it
might not make sense to use them indiscriminately in every situation, even if law enforcement officers have
the right to do so. However, if mechanical devices are produced that can conduct a binary search for
narcotics, the cost of conducting such a search could become much lower—analogous to the use of a radar
detector—and police would have no economic incentive to conduct a binary search only when suspicious
circumstances exist.
212
See Bird, supra note 99,at 427 -32.
213
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ____; 2005 LEXIS at *7, see also supra note 180-186 and accompanying text.
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certainty level, law enforcement agents could conceivably boost the accuracy rates—and
make binary searches more palatable—by using the devices only in situations where there
is a relatively high chance of detecting illegal activity.
2.

Standard of accuracy

The Caballes case presented two possible standards for accuracy before a specific
type of surveillance could be considered a “binary search.” The first, put forward by the
majority opinion with little analysis, was to essentially allow any binary search as long as
it was reliable enough to provide the law enforcement officer with probable cause.214
Thus, as long the false positives themselves did not disclose legitimate, protected
information to the law enforcement officer, using the binary technique would not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.215 As noted above,216 this argument de-links the binary
search itself from the full-blown search that inevitably follows a binary search; justifying
the former on the grounds that a false positive does not in itself reveal any information
about the subject, and then independently justifying the latter on the grounds that a
positive result from a binary search, even one with a significant error rate, is sufficient to
provide probable cause to support the search. The Court’s analysis is blind to the fact
that in practice, a false positive does in fact lead to a search, and thus does reveal
legitimate protected information about the subject—and this willful blindness would
result in court approval of binary searches with exceedingly high error rates, leading to a
large proportion of unjustified searches of innocent individuals.
The other proposed standard was put forward by Justice Souter in his dissent. By
linking the false positives to the searches which they will inevitably engender, he argued
214

Id. at *7.
Id.
216
See supra notes 180 - 201 and accompanying text.
215
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that for a binary search to be truly “binary,” it would have to provide the law enforcement
officer with “certainty” that illegal activity was present.217 Without 100% certainty,
according to Justice Souter, there will be a chance that the so-called binary search will
start a process in motion that will inescapably lead to the warrantless search of a
legitimate, protected area controlled by an innocent individual.218 But a test that requires
“certainty” can never be met in real life; there is always the possibility of error – indeed,
even the “certain” case of Jacobsen still contained the possibility of human error in
administering the test.
A proper analysis must acknowledge (as Justice Souter does) that a false positive
will in fact lead to disclosure of legitimate, protected information. But this does not
mean that only “perfect” binary searches should be allowed; such a requirement would
effectively eviscerate the binary search doctrine, 219 a doctrine which is now firmly
entrenched in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, given the possibility that
binary searches will gain widespread use, potentially affecting millions of people a day,
courts should impose an extremely high standard of accuracy to ensure this new legal
doctrine is not abused by law enforcement. This would entail two requirements, one
procedural, the other substantive.
The procedural step would be to require trial judges to conduct an independent
evaluation of any method or technique which the prosecutor claims to be a binary search.
In other words, whenever law enforcement conducts a binary-type surveillance without
217

Id. at *13 - *15 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
219
This, of course, is exactly what Justice Souter had in mind when he proposed a “certainty” standard that
was unattainable by any real-world binary device. As noted above, supra note 117–118 and accompanying
text, the binary search doctrine has its critics, but at this point it seems clear that the Supreme Court has
accepted them as constitutional, and any attempt to abolish them by applying an unworkable standard of
accuracy will fail. Thus, a more useful course of action would be to set an extremely high—but still
attainable—standard and set up procedural safeguards to ensure that the standards are in fact met.
218
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reasonable suspicion and seeks to admit evidence that resulted from the surveillance
under the Caballes doctrine, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving to the court that
the surveillance method in question was sufficiently accurate to be classified as a binary
search.220 This evaluation could be analogized to the Daubert hearings in evaluating
expert evidence, in which the trial judge acts as the “gatekeeper” in determining whether
a particular field or discipline is reliable enough to be admissible.221 Unlike the Daubert
context, however, where a judge must simply determine whether a particular science or
methodology is “scientifically valid,”222 a judge evaluating a binary search would impose
a much stricter standard223 – but the point of the procedural requirement is to ensure that
the judge has the information necessary to make an evaluation as to the level of accuracy
of the surveillance in question. Of course, if the law enforcement officer possessed
probable cause to carry out the search, there will be no need to conduct such a hearing;
similarly, if the law enforcement agent possessed some degree of reasonable suspicion,
the court would first conduct a Terry inquiry to see whether the agent had sufficient
articulable facts to justify the search.224 If so the search would pass constitutional muster
without the need to resort to the Caballes doctrine; if not, the court would proceed with a
hearing to determine whether the search was a binary search and thereby fell outside the
reach of the Fourth Amendment.

220

Some courts have shown resistance to a requirement that the government demonstrate the accuracy rates
of their drug-detection dogs. In United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985), the appellate court
upheld the lower court’s decision prohibiting disclosure of the United States Customs Service narcotics
training manual on the grounds that it would compromise investigative techniques.
221
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (holding that judges are
responsible for determining whether the proffered expert testimony is scientific evidence which would
assist the trier of fact).
222
Id.
223
See infra notes 226–229 and accompanying text.
224
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21.
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Although conducting this evaluation will be time-consuming at first, courts will
quickly begin to establish precedents as to the acceptability or fallibility of certain
techniques. Thus, once a device’s accuracy rate had been established by precedent, there
would be no reason why courts in the same jurisdiction should need to decide de novo
whether, say, a drug dog or a specific type of gun detector was considered a binary
search. In such a case all a court would have to determine would be whether the specific
use of the binary search in that particular case was proper (e.g, was the drug detection
dog properly trained, or was the gun detector properly calibrated). The reliance on
precedent to certify or reject certain forms of surveillance will also provide helpful
guidance to law enforcement agents as to what devices and procedures they would be
allowed to use without reasonable suspicion.225
As far as the substantive standard itself, it must be high enough to ensure that the
binary search doctrine’s inevitable widespread indiscriminant application does not result
in overwhelming numbers of unjustified searches of innocent subjects. Justice Souter’s
“certainty” requirement was unworkable in the real world, but given the enormous
number of binary searches which might be conducted on innocent individuals, courts
should adopt a standard that adapts the desire for “certainty” to the imperfections of the
real world. For example, a standard analogous to the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard in the criminal jury instructions context might be appropriate. As in the
probable cause context, courts will probably shy away from quantifying exactly the level
225

As noted above, supra note 224, if the law enforcement agent possessed probable cause or even
reasonable suspicion to conduct the search, there might be no need to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the surveillance was a binary search; rather, the court could simply conduct a Terry inquiry to
ensure that the law enforcement agent possessed sufficient “specific and articulable facts to reasonably
warrant the intrusion.” Terry, 392 at 20-21. If so, the search would be constitutional regardless of its status
as a binary search; if not, the prosecutor could still seek to get the search “certified” as a binary search, in
which case it would not need to pass the Terry test.
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of accuracy required226 (especially because any number chosen would be rightly seen as
arbitrary), but in conducting their analysis, they should be careful to focus on the positive
predictive value of the method—that is, the percentage chance that a positive alert will in
fact indicate the existence of contraband. This will require not just evidence of the false
positive rate during training or testing (although this could help the judge to determine
the positive predictive value), but actual numbers from the field work conducted by law
enforcement officers using the device or procedure. As noted above,227 using a binary
device or procedure indiscriminantly will tend to decrease the positive predictive value
due to the high volume of innocent individuals that will be targeted. This will not
necessarily lead to an unacceptably low level of accuracy; if the device or procedure has
an extremely high false positive rate, the positive predictive value could remain quite
high even if the binary search is used randomly on the general population.228 However, if
the binary search in question has a lower false positive rate (for newer technology still in
development, for example), law enforcement officers could bolster the positive predictive
value and perhaps meet a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard by only using the device
or procedure in settings or on individuals with a higher-than average likelihood of being
guilty.229 By exercising discretion in the use of these less accurate binary searches, and

226

See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (noting that probable cause is defined as a “fair
probability” and avoiding any numerical probability requirement).
227
See supra notes 211–212and accompanying text.
228
For example, assume a binary search with a false positive rate of one in ten million, and assume further
it was searching for contraband (such as possession of computer child porn files) which was possessed by
one in one hundred thousand people. If used randomly on the general population, this search would have a
positive predictive value of over 99% (for example, if used on ten million people in one year, it would
return 101 positive results, 100 of which would be true positives and only one of which would be a false
positive). This could certainly satisfy a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for accuracy.
229
This is not to say the law enforcement officers would have to have some level of “reasonable suspicion”
before conducting the binary search; such a requirement would obviate the need for the binary search
doctrine in the first place. There may be many contexts in which the likelihood of finding illegal activity
would be significantly increased even if the law enforcement officer could not articulate specific facts to
justify reasonable suspicion: officers acting on an unquantifiable hunch, for example, or only using the
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thereby reducing the proportion of innocent individuals subject to the search, law
enforcement could dramatically increase the positive predictive value of the search in
practice and thus potentially meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard imposed by
the courts.
B.

Invasiveness

Once binary searches have been properly and consistently defined, their use may
still be limited by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. A
device or procedure may be truly binary, in that it returns only information about the
presence or absence of illegal activity with a very high positive predictive value—but if it
requires the subject of the search (or her belongings) to be detained for an unreasonable
amount of time, its use may constitute an unconstitutional seizure.230
This Article has already the importance of separating the binary search
determination from the seizure question, since the level of “physical invasiveness” should
not make the surveillance any more or less likely to be found a binary search.231 But
assuming a court does determine that a given device or procedure constitutes a valid
binary search, the court must then look to the degree of seizure involved in the case and
determine if it is serious enough to implicate Terry. If not, the government action will be
constitutional; if so, the courts must apply the balancing test mandated by Terry to see if
enough reasonable suspicion existed to justify the seizure.
As long as the seizure question is separated from the binary search question and
analyzed on its own, it becomes relatively simple to resolve, since it does not require the

binary device in certain locations (such as airports or bus depots) where illegal activity is more likely to be
occurring.
230
See, e.g., Place, 462 U.S. at 709 (Ninety minute seizure of individual’s luggage was unreasonable).
231
See supra notes128–161 and accompanying text.
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courts to do anything they are not already doing in other contexts. There is an enormous
amount of case law to guide courts as to what actions on the part of law enforcement
constitute a Terry stop, and what actions go so far as to require probable cause.232
Generally, two different factors come into play: the length of the search233 and the
physical invasiveness of the search.234 In determining whether a certain delay or level of
invasiveness is reasonable, courts will look to the specific facts of each case: for example,
whether the item being seized an individual, a piece of luggage, or a piece of mail.235
There are two contexts in which a court would evaluate whether a binary search
involved an improper seizure: first, to determine whether the use of the binary search
itself was a seizure; and second, in a situation (as in Caballes) in which law enforcement
already had probable cause to effect a seizure, and then conducted a binary search during
the course of the already legitimate seizure. In each case, there is sufficient case law
232

These determinations are always very fact-specific, but the tests for judges to follow have been set out in
numerous cases. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (“[A]n investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. It is the state’s burden to demonstrate that the seizure it
seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to
satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.” (citations omitted)).
233
Place itself made clear the importance of the delay caused by the search: although the drug sniff itself
was a suitable binary search, the 90-minute seizure of the bag was such a prolonged delay that the
procedure violated the Fourth Amendment. Place, 462 U.S. at 709. A lengthy delay can also convert an
otherwise permissible “investigative stop” justified under Terry into an arrest which must be supported by
probable cause. See, e,g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (“Obviously if an
investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative
stop.”)
234
One of the factors in determining the level of “physical invasiveness” is the “intimidating” or
“offensive” nature of the conduct by the law enforcement. See, e.g., Powers v. Plumas Unified School
Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999) (a dog sniffing students in close proximity violates the Fourth
Amendment because “the level of intrusiveness is greater when the dog is permitted to sniff a person than
when a dog sniffs unattended luggage.”) The Powers case unfortunately applied the “intrusiveness” factor
to the search question rather than the seizure question, holding that the canine sniff infringed on the
students’ “reasonable expectation of privacy” because the use of the dog was “offensive.” Id. The link
between the “offensiveness” of the method used by law enforcement and the degree to which someone’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed is not clear; however, the link between offensiveness and the
degree of seizure is quite strong.
235
Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (90-minute seizure of someone’s luggage is
unreasonable) with United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970) (one day seizure of a letter
that had been sent through the mail not unreasonable).

59
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

already to guide courts in determining whether a seizure occurred. In the first context, if
the binary search does not cause the subject of the search any delay and is not physically
invasive, no seizure has occurred. This principle could conceivably cover the vast
majority of binary searches—when a portable gun detector scans passing pedestrians and
automobiles, for example; or a video camera records images and sends them to a
computer running facial recognition software; or a computer program screens e-mails
being sent through the internet. As long as all of these searches only produce binary
results, they do not constitute a search, and since they do not “seize” the subject of the
search or any of his or her possessions, they do not implicate the Fourth Amendment in
any way. After Caballes, drug detection dogs that merely sniff the outside of an
automobile are also not a seizure; Justice Ginsburg’s dissent notwithstanding,236 their use
does not create a level of humiliation or intimidation significant enough to implicate the
Fourth Amendment.
However, all binary searches may not be so unobtrusive. It is certainly
conceivable that a binary search may cause some minor amount of delay—the subject
might have to stand still for a moment while the dog sniffs her or while the gun detector
gets an accurate reading. Or a mechanical narcotics detector may only work if it is
physically touching the subject. As soon as we add in some level of delay or physical
invasiveness, two questions arise – does the subject of the stop feel free to “disregard the
police and go about his business,”237 and if not, can the seizure be justified under Terry
principles? Thus, assuming the police do not possess an articulable suspicion to justify
the stop under Terry, any amount of delay or physical invasiveness must be consensual.
236

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. ___, ___; 2005 LEXIS 769, *28–*29 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (police may approach an individual and ask questions,
as long as the individual feels free to disregard the police and terminate the encounter).

237
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The analysis becomes somewhat more complicated if law enforcement seeks to
prolong an otherwise legitimate stop, as was the case in Caballes. The Illinois Supreme
Court in Caballes found that the addition of a drug detection dog to the traffic stop
violated the Fourth Amendment because it changed the “scope” of the seizure;238 the
United States Supreme Court made it clear that there must be some more tangible extra
element of seizure in order to implicate the Fourth Amendment.239 In such a case, courts
must determine whether the binary search created an extended delay or an element of
physical invasiveness beyond what was justified by the original stop.240 For example, if
law enforcement agents have set up a roadblock for a permissible purpose (such as
checking for drunk drivers241 or illegal immigrants242), the agents are allowed to conduct
a binary search during that roadblock as long as the search does not increase the amount
of time required for the stop.243
However, any extra delay of an otherwise legitimate stop will require additional
articulable facts to justify the seizure. For example, if a police officer during a legitimate
traffic stop has completed writing the traffic citation, she cannot then force the motorist
to wait an additional amount of time for the arrival of a drug detection dog unless she has

238

Illinois v. Caballes, 207 Ill.2d 504, 508-10, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204-5 (2004).
Caballes, 543 U.S. at ___; 2005 LEXIS at *8.
240
See, e.g., Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1553 (11th Cir. 1995) (since drug detection dogs used at an
otherwise constitutional roadblock did not increase the amount of delay suffered by motorists, the “state's
decision to use dogs at the roadblocks does not make the operation unconstitutional.”)
241
See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 456 (1990) (allowing a delay of twentyfive seconds at a random sobriety checkpoint).
242
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 544-48 (1976) (allowing a delay of up to three to
five minutes at random roadblocks meant to check for illegal immigrants).
243
See, e.g., Moore, 58 F.3d at 1553; United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994) (fifteen
minute wait at a routine traffic stop was not unreasonable, and because the standard aspects of a traffic stop
took the entire fifteen minutes, the use of a drug detection dog during that time did not increase the length
of the seizure and was therefore constitutional).
239
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acquired additional articulable facts to justify a longer seizure.244 If there is any
additional delay or invasiveness caused by the binary search, the court should conduct a
Terry analysis to see if any articulable facts justified the extension of the seizure,
balancing the level of reasonable suspicion supporting the extension with the increased
severity of the seizure.245
VI.

Conclusion
Although surveillance techniques and data analysis methods have improved

dramatically over the last hundred years, law enforcement agents for the most part must
still search for evidence of illegal activity the same way they did in the eighteenth
century: by spying, snooping, and eavesdropping on our lives. Law enforcement
investigators must invariably recover large amounts of private information about any
particular suspect (as well as information about those who are not even suspected) and
then sift through that information to determine whether the suspect is guilty of a crime.
Given this fact, it is inevitable that as data-gathering and information-sharing
technologies become more sophisticated, the actions of law enforcement agents will
conflict ever more deeply with our civil liberties and privacy rights. This conflict is
harmful to both sides of the balance: it limits the effectiveness of the new technologies
that law enforcement agents have at their disposal to investigate crime; and it inevitably
244

See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 877–78 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n officer conducting a
routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a
citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he
must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional
questioning.”) (citations omitted).
245
See. e.g., United States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1991). In Taylor, the defendant’s car was
stopped at a permissible roadblock checking for illegal aliens and the length of the seizure was then
increased by sixty seconds so that a drug detection dog could sniff the exterior of the car. The Ninth
Circuit held that because the defendant “became increasingly nervous and uneasy at the end of the initial
check for aliens,” his behavior constituted minimal, articulable suspicion and therefore justified the brief
further delay.” Id. In this case the extra amount of seizure was minimal (a mere sixty seconds) and
therefore could be justified by a very low level of reasonable suspicion.
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reveals more and more intimate details about our private lives to law enforcement
officials.
Binary searches will quite possibly revolutionize the way in which law
enforcement agents conduct surveillance. Illinois v. Caballes has given law enforcement
agents a green light (if not a cart blanche) to develop and use this type of surveillance
aggressively and broadly. At the same time, modern technologies are quickly evolving to
the point where machines and computers can supplant humans as the agents which sift
through the private, protected data in order to determine whether criminal activity is
present. Caballes will likely provide the impetus for law enforcement agents to adapt
emerging technologies to turn them into binary searches. But even this preliminary step
of designing binary search techniques—not to mention using them or evaluating them in
court—requires courts to provide the relevant actors with a sensible and uniform method
of analysis.
Although the binary search doctrine remains controversial, and will no doubt
become more so as law enforcement agents push the envelope regarding how (and how
often) they use such searches, both proponents and critics of the doctrine should agree
that binary searches must be more carefully defined and evaluated. AfterCaballes , there
is no question that the binary search doctrine is here to stay; now we must ensure they
can safely and effectively deliver on their promise.
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